Voting machine

A dialer is a mechanically or electrically powered device that is used in elections to the casting and counting of votes. Mainly come here today voting machines are used, which substantially alter the existing electoral process. They are referred to in Germany as electronic or computerized voting machines.

The manufacturers of electronic voting machines ( Nedap, Diebold ) promise reduction of staff, a quick count result, the avoidance of counting errors, a lighter voting for the disabled and avoiding inadvertently invalid votes. Critics manipulations possible and also include counting errors due to technical error not enough. A possible election fraud can not be detected without storage of ballots; an electoral process without manual evaluation is transparent. In addition, maintaining the secrecy of voting is insecure and uncertain about the cost of voting machines, so the critics.

It is controversial whether and under what circumstances, voting machines are suitable for carrying out correct, and secret elections. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court declared on 3 March 2009 in a landmark decision which hitherto unconstitutional. The use of voting machines was only under strict conditions with the Basic Law ( see below).

• 2.1 used in Germany and the Netherlands voting machines
• 2.2 maintaining the secrecy of voting
• 2.3 Examples of problems with voting machines (abroad)

• 3.1 Legal basis
• 3.2 Approval of equipment
• 3.3 Legal proceedings / Petitions (2005-2008 )
• 3.4 The Federal Constitutional Court in terms of " voting machines " (2009)

Types of voting machines

Worldwide, there are a wide variety of mechanical voting machines and voting machines:

Mechanical voting machines

Worldwide, there are a variety of mechanical devices for election management, from simple perforation equipment for ballots in the U.S. to voting machines, the voices capture mechanically.

Still federal election 2005, two variants of mechanical voting machines in Germany were admitted. In a variant is in the voting booth, a chip in the slot that is assigned to a particular party, or abstention, was introduced. Characterized a mechanical counter is actuated which increases the count of the selected party. Furthermore, the chips are collected separately for each party in a bag in order to facilitate a possible verification of the election. After the election, the individual meter readings are added and compared with the number of votes cast. Another variant are devices in which the voters a button has to pull up to a certain point of resistance so as to cast his vote.

Mechanical devices were last used in Germany only in a few municipalities, since they no longer were more complicated requirements ( cumulating and vote-splitting ) requirements.

Voting machines

When voting computers are computers that are equipped with special hardware and software for the conduct of elections. Worldwide there are a variety of types in use, which are used for the delivery of votes or for automatic counting of ballots on document reader either.

The last single approved in Germany voting machines were the devices of the Integral electoral system (device associated with choice and device application software) the Nedap / HSG Electoral Systems GmbH. " Integral electoral system ," it said, because it not only supported the conduct of the election act with hardware and software, but included the world's only electoral system as software for the preparation and review of an election. The system used in this case was closed source, a check on the integrity of the source code was not permitted the interested public in the course of using the Bundestag and European elections. The Federal Constitutional Court has stated in its judgment of 3 March 2009, use of these voting computers due to lack of public accountability for unconstitutional.

The Nedap devices saw in degraded state like a suitcase that turned a few steps into a voting booth. For the election board there was a device connected to the control unit with which he released the choice for each individual voter. The ballot was mapped to an integrated operating unit and the voters could choose their votes by pressing a key. After he had done this he pressed a button " vote ".

The devices were made to June 2006, about 15 million votes cast in 84 German towns and cities in elections at the municipal, state and federal levels. Among the users included, among others cities such as Cologne, Dortmund, Cottbus or Koblenz.

2007 cost a voting machine 4,750 euros.

One of the biggest manufacturers were:

• Nedap (Netherlands) - Nedap established the only previous voting machines, which were approved in Germany for Federal and European elections, its use, however, was declared unconstitutional in 2009 and is therefore prohibited.
• Diebold (USA)
• ES & S ( USA)
• Sequoia (USA)
• Indra (Spain )

See also: Digital Wahlstift

Security

The use of computers over a ballot paper presents different and new requirements relating to the electoral process and the election evaluation. The extent to which equipment failure excluded and manipulation can be guaranteed, is controversial for years.

Voting machines used in Germany and the Netherlands

The group " Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet " and the Chaos Computer Club ( CCC) have demonstrated on 5 October 2006 on Dutch television that the Nedap voting machines are easily manipulated without the manipulation of a returning officer or voters would be understandable. The device used in this case of type ES3B different from the types used in Germany ESD1 and ESD2 only in little things, which are mainly due to the different electoral systems.

In a detailed report on its investigation, the groups describe more safety deficiencies:

• The locks on all devices can be opened with the same keys that can be bought for one euro.
• The administration password ( " SECRET " ) the management software was included in plain text in binary code.
• A man-in- the-middle attack between the keyboard, display and store the votes would be possible. A sealing equipment, such as it was carried out in the mayoral election, 2006 in Cottbus could complicate this attack, but the quality of the seals used is criticized. In addition, the seal does not prevent the possible replacement of the voice module.

The Physikalisch -Technische Bundesanstalt ( PTB) had conducted the audit for the voting machines in Germany. The PTB holds a manipulation of the elections for basically possible. However, an attacker would have expertise and a lot of criminal energy bring. At least the criminal energy has already been demonstrated in Hamburg, and in other cases by the election fraud scandal of Dachau and the events surrounding the nomination of the SPD candidate for mayor in 2007. In the U.S., cases have been reported in which elections may have been manipulated by the design of ballot papers for mechanical voting machines and software.

The distribution of registered in the Federal Republic of Germany gewesenen equipment Nedap, HSG Electoral Systems GmbH, commented on the tamper resistance of its devices in several press releases.

Members of the CCC and Dutch computer experts have conducted field tests on voting machines in German polling stations. It was discovered in a number of ways to manipulate the election results both at will as " tapping" and the voting behavior of a voter. About this safety deficiencies a detailed report for the Federal Constitutional Court was created in May 2007.

Maintaining the secrecy of voting

Electronic devices can deliver by compromising emanations conclusions about their activities. In order to prevent unauthorized reading of the data being processed, for example by Van Eck phreaking ( TEMPEST ), voting machines must be properly shielded. The more a potential reader approaches the voting machine, the more difficult this task.

Since voting machines are open to the public, the maintenance of secrecy of the ballot a major technical challenge An effective countermeasure must go, for example, well over an otherwise conventional shielding of sensitive corporate computers to which the public normally does not approach so near. The Federal Office for Security in Information Technology (BSI ) are recommendations to protect state classified and sensitive company computer; a recommendation specifically for voting machines are not currently available.

Examples of problems with voting machines (abroad)

• In the presidential elections in the United States in 2000 delayed the vote counting in Florida, because a correct evaluation of the selected means of mechanically stan zender voting machines ballot was not possible. The new touchscreen devices made ​​for breakdowns and in 2007 the decision was made to abolish paperless voting machines again. Ballots are detected by a scanner for evaluation, the results can be count in doubt by hand. Striking is that Florida was a pioneer in the field of the voting machines, with their decision to abolish the voting computer again, is understood by experts as a sustainable signal.
• In the midterm elections in the United States on 7 November 2006, had to vote with an electronic voting machine about 80 percent of the electorate. One-third of the electorate was here for the first time confronted with new appliances. There were massive problems.
• Italy is said to have stopped in the reign of Romano Prodi in November 2006, all voting machines projects, due to forgery allegations in the parliamentary elections in April 2006.
• In August 2008, the company, Premier Election Solutions admitted after a suit of the U.S. state of Ohio, that it came due to a software error in its voting machines to false counting of votes. The software error was already included ten years undetected.

Germany

Legal basis

The basis for the use of voting machines made ​​to § 35 Federal Electoral Act ( BWahlG ) and the measures adopted on the basis thereof Federal Voting Machine Ordinance ( Federal Voting Machine Ordinance ), which was declared on 3 March 2009 by the Federal Constitutional Court to be unconstitutional.

Approval of equipment

In Germany two devices were previously admitted.

Newly registered device type were a central test procedures in accordance with the Federal Voting Machine Ordinance by the Physikalisch -Technische Bundesanstalt subjected before the Federal Ministry of the Interior issued shall an authorization for its use to certain elections. However, an examination of the individual devices did not take place as long as the manufacturer promised the identical construction with a tested type.

A control option such approved devices for the voter was not, as a publication of the complete test reports and related documents has so far refused, citing trade secrets of the manufacturer.

Critics say the Federal Office for Security in Information Technology more suitable for the testing of voting machines programmed as the Physikalisch -Technische Bundesanstalt.

Legal proceedings / Petitions (2005-2008)

Because of the concern about manipulating security, to safeguard the secrecy of the ballot and the lack of public participation in elections with the voting machines used in Germany, there were and are several court proceedings:

• Against the use of voting computers in the mayoral election in 2006 in Cottbus an election, opposition was filed. The appointment of the Mayor was moved by eight days on the November 28, 2006, the appeal was rejected but.
• Of 17 October 2006 to 28 November 2006, a federal petition for deleting § ran 35 federal election law, which received more than 45,000 supporters.
• November 2007: The Petitions Committee of the German Bundestag declared the foregoing petition of 2006: In a so essential for democracy range as the conduct of elections, it is the Committee of enormous importance conception to leave no confusion or doubt [ ... ] The by the voting machines benefits gained in the election process are therefore according to the Committee's view of all proportion to the threat by them at any time disadvantage. A little later, the Bundestag upon the recommendation of the Committee on Petitions to transfer the petition against voting computers of the federal government as a material and to give the parties in the German Bundestag note.
• January 2008: With the help of the CCC filed a Hessian voter a request for a temporary injunction to leave prohibit the use of voting machines the company Nedap at the state election in Hesse in 2008. On January 23, the Constitutional Court rejected the application because a pre-routed choice test is inadmissible in an ongoing election process.

The Federal Constitutional Court in terms of " voting machines " (2009)

Against the use of voting machines in the 2005 federal election there were some objections, which had rejected the German Bundestag by order of 14 December 2006. Against the decision of the Federal Parliament in mid-February 2007 were collected Verification complaints to the Federal Constitutional Court. A report by the Chaos Computer Club (CCC ) dated June 2007, the Federal Constitutional Court of the voting machines the company Nedap had tested. The published analysis dealt critically with the principles established by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the manufacturer claims about the security of the system.

On 3 March 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the Federal Voting Machine Ordinance unconstitutional. The voting machines used in the elections to the 16th Bundestag did not meet the requirements of the Basic Law by the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court.

Constitutional Court judges require for the use of voting machines "that the essential steps of the voting and results analysis by the citizen reliably and without special expertise " must be verifiable. They stressed the principle of the public nature of elections, in conjunction with Article 20, Paragraphs 1 and 2 it follows from Article 38 of the Basic Law and territories, " that all essential steps in the elections of public verifiability subject ".

Economic Aspects

Through a request for information under the Dutch Freedom of Information Act, the Dutch group could Wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet ( "We trust election computers" ) in July 2006 documents to the conversion of polls published on voting machines in Amsterdam. According to the paper, thus, the cost per election from 1.6 million to 2.7 million euros.

Quotes

"There will never be able to give a choice device that is tamper-proof to yourself. "

"Trust is good, control is not possible."

"When people have shown from the Chaos Computer Club on how to hack a voting computer in 60 seconds, then I show them that I can share a ballot box by ballot in 30 seconds. "