Analogy of the Sun

The sun parable is a well known parable of ancient philosophy. It comes from the Greek philosopher Plato ( 428/427-348/347 BC), who can tell it in the sixth book of his dialogue Politeia of his teacher Socrates. Then carries Socrates before the line parable that ends the sixth book. At the beginning of the seventh book which Allegory of the Cave, the last of the three famous parables in the Republic follows. All three parables illustrate statements of Plato's ontology and epistemology.

In the three parables specifically Platonic ideas are put forward. The " Platonic " Socrates, who appears here as a speaker and tells the parables, is a fictional figure figure. His position therefore can not be equated with that of the historical Socrates.

In the parable of the sun Platonic Socrates tried the good, rather than to define it directly, a parable to illustrate. He compares it with the sun: how in the field of the visible, the sun is a source of light, the all-conquering power, as there is in the spiritual world is good as a source of truth and knowledge.

History dialog

In the sixth book of the Republic, the Platonic Socrates explains his interlocutors, Glaucon and Adeimantus, the two brothers of Plato, the ethical and intellectual requirements that one has to fulfill in order to be qualified for political leadership tasks in an ideal, ruled by philosopher State. A participating at the State Steering philosopher needs an ethical framework for its decisions. It is not enough that his disposition of character comprises the basic virtues of justice, prudence, courage and wisdom. These virtues are only useful if you have captured its essence philosophically in a perfect manner. But this is possible only to those who can derive the virtues of a their parent principle, which is their common source and base, and has gained about this principle clarity.

In the following discussion of Socrates, knowledge of the Platonic doctrine of ideas is required. Plato assumes that the sensible world is the only intellectually accessible ( intelligible ) realm of ideas downstream. The ideas are real, independently existing, unchanging archetypes, the sense objects whose images. The existence and quality of the images is due to the pre-images. The timeless being of ideas is the being in the true sense of Plato. The variable and transient objects of sense, however, is only a conditional and thus incomplete being that they owe the ideas. Their properties reflect the nature of ideas; For example, a material thing is nice if and as long as the idea of ​​the beautiful maps in it.

The origin of all virtues is " good" per se, that is, in the terminology of the theory of ideas, the idea of good. You owe all that is good, the property to be good. It is the highest principle. Only when one knows about it, all other knowledge is useful and beneficial. A virtue can only be true if you know how it is also good. The insight into the nature of the Idea of ​​the Good is the ultimate goal of philosophical striving for knowledge of the Platonic Socrates. However, he also stresses that such insight is difficult to obtain; the way to it was far and troublesome. It 'm here to " Biggest Lesson ", the " most to learners " ( Megiston mathematical ).

Although every soul seeks the good thing, but what it is that people just guessed where they tend to be subject to error. The widespread opinion that good is equated with the desire is misguided, since no one denies that there are also bad desire. Also known as insight can be good does not define, because that can only mean one related to itself insight, which the definition is circular.

After these statements of Socrates, he is asked about his own view. He professes not to know what is good. Although he had an opinion about it, but it was better to allow this question aside " for now ". Since he, under the circumstances, does not hold a trial to determine the best direct route would be useful, he chooses to go via a parable. The unknown Good to be the interlocutors brought home by its well-known and very similar to him, " offspring ". Thus Socrates thinks the sun.

Of introduction, Socrates suggests that the starting point of the following discussion is the idea of ​​teaching. According to her, the visible good individual things " the good itself " hang in several ways with the idea of ​​the good, together. In the parable of Socrates the relationship as an analogy type of relationship; Good in the field of the visible is to illustrate the idea of ​​the good and their mode of action.

The parable

Socrates argues that the sense of sight from the hearing and the other senses differs in that he can not get in touch easily with its objects, but to an additional element, the light needs. The light, which is obviously something noble, provides a delicious link between the sense of sight and the visible dar. This band is of divine origin. Among the heavenly gods Helios, the sun god, who is responsible for the generation of light. The sun owe the people an opportunity to see the visible. The relationship between the sun and the sense of sight is also reflected in the fact that the eye is the " sonnenhafteste " among all the sense organs. The ability of the eye to see Socrates considered as a gift from the sun god. From the specific nature of the sense of sight, the primacy of seeing results over all other senses.

The Sun is a " sprout " or " descendant " of goodness and therefore like him in terms of their nature and mode of action. As a result of the Platonic Socrates an analogy relation: So how does the good to think and what is thought in the spiritual realm, so behaves in the field of the visible, the sun to see and to seen. The eye is hindered in the nighttime darkness. It can develop properly his sight only when the objects to see it are illuminated by the sun. Similar conditions exist in the spiritual realm where the soul the perceiving instance, their reason ( nous ), the vision and the good, the " light source " is. When the soul is concerned with that was made and ephemeral, which is relatively far from the " light source ", then it directs its attention to Darkened. Therefore, they can not arrive at the correct understanding then, just as the eye in dim lighting hardly see anything. But she turns the immutable truth and the real beings and imperishable to the ideas they have seen the light of the spiritual drenched. Then she looks as if the splendor of this reality, just as the sense of sight, the things on which the daylight falls, clearly detected.

The sense of sight and the light are indeed sun -like, but they are not the sun. Similarly, the knowledge and the apparent truth that opens up thinking the thinker, the good ones are similar but not the same as him. Rather, the good is on the knowledge and truth and surpasses both in beauty. It is the instance that enables knowledge of the truth, because it gives the knowable truth and the knower, the capacity for knowledge. In addition, the good is still in a far broader sense causally. Just as the sun is not only the visible gives the visibility, but also provides the Expectant food and allows growth, the Good gives the discernible not only recognition, but also its existence and its essence. Like the sun, without being a becoming, the becoming of becoming, causes, so the good causes being (to einai ) and essence ( ousia ) of spiritual reality, although itself the realm of being and essence does not belong, but on suits him and hits him on originality and power.

Interpretation

Truth as unconcealment

For Plato there is an analogy between the visibility that gives the sunlight sense objects, and the recognition that gives the light of truth spiritual knowledge objects. The light of truth allows the philosophers to capture the being. In this comparison, probably the etymology of the Greek word aletheia plays ( "truth" ) as " unconcealment " a role. ( " Be hidden " ) The relationship between lanthanein, Lethe ( "forgetting ", " oblivion " ) and Alethes ( "true", originally meaning " unhidden ", " common knowledge" ) was for the Greek feeling for language already to the formation time of the Homeric seal a matter of course; Plato also had become aware of how a number of places in his works show.

The question of the existence transcendence of the Good

Famous and very controversial in the research is the finding at the end of the exposition of the parable, the good was "not the ousia " but " beyond the ousia " and meet them on originality and power. The term ousia (literally " beingness " ) is usually translated as "being" or "essence"; Plato both meanings occur. By "being" is the characteristic of the Platonic ideas about temporal Its meant, in contrast to the non-existence to existence and way of becoming, and transitory. Added to the difficult spot numerous historians of philosophy have presented a wealth of interpretative proposals. It is disputed whether or not to understand "beyond the ousia " in the sense of absolute transcendence.

A number of influential philosophy historians interpret "beyond the ousia " in the sense of absolute transcendence of the Idea of ​​the Good. According to this line of research here Socrates, Plato can say there is something that is the parent of the immutable and perfect being the purely spiritual reality, so in terms of this perfect being is transcendent. This is - for the first time in the history of Western philosophy - the transcendence of being an absolute principle stated. The idea of ​​good differs according to this view from all other ideas in principle, in that it confers other being, but does not itself belong to the realm of being, but exceeds. Since it is the reason of being of all other ideas, owes the area, which includes these ideas, you his existence. The cause of this entire area, it can not belong to himself, but must be ontologically locates above him. Thus - as thought the ancient Neoplatonists - equate the thematized in the sun parable good with the " a ", which is treated in Plato's dialogue Parmenides and in Neo-Platonism is the seinstranszendente absolute principle.

The consequences of being transcendence are or appear partially paradoxical. If the good is classified above of being himself so the predicate ' ( is ) being " can not be awarded, would the statement" The good thing is not " true, what could be construed as a denial of the existence of good. What is meant is not a non-being, that would be a lack of being, but a " Übersein " of the good. As the source of all being good can not be a lack of that which emanates from it have. The statement " The good thing is not " can be answered affirmatively for an absolutely transcendent good in the sense that it is not "something", but not in the sense that it must be referred to as "nothing". This raises the further question of whether something be visible above the being disposed above no if meaningful statements about it are possible and how the " Übersein " behaves to be.

The assumption that Plato had kept the best for seinstranszendent, however, comes in the research also decided opposition. The opposing view is that he had the idea of ​​good, although sharply demarcated from the rest of ideas and assigned to it a unique primacy, but it locates within the range of about temporal being of ideas. Indeed, let a number of utterances of Plato realize that he is - at least from a particular viewing perspective - considered legitimate to classify the good in the realm of being. For example, he calls it " the most blissful of beings " and "the most brilliant of beings ". The researchers, who consider the good as Plato not seinstranszendent, interpret the "beyond ousia " in the solar parable relativizing not as Übersein, but as a special being beyond being the other ideas. Rafael Ferber brought forward the hypothesis of the ontological contradiction between the assertion of the transcendence of being in the sun parable and the points at which Plato conceives the good as a being was, wanted. This contradiction should make the reader aware that the idea of ​​good is not consistent linguistically represented. You transcend the thinking and therefore this random when it deals with her into an inevitable paradox. Theodor Ebert, however, infers from the analogy between the sun and the idea of ​​the good, this idea is after the likeness of the thoughts as accessible as the sun of vision. Thus Plato had not taken her for denktranszendent. In addition, Ebert says, in the Republic shall not claim that the idea of ​​good is greater than that Being. " Beyond the ousia " it is in the sense that it is beyond the nature of the objects of knowledge, but not in the sense of being transcendence. With ousia here is only the essence, not meant being.

The reason the allegorical representation

A further discussed in the research question is why the Platonic Socrates his opinion on what is good itself, does not comment directly, but they will leave aside " for now " and instead recites the sun parable. The reason he gives to the difficulty of the problem that does not even dealt with the " current run " at the level of a mere hypothesis makes sense, much could really be dealt with because. He is not referring, as was assumed in the earlier research literature sometimes, a fundamental impossibility immediate presentation of the facts. Rather, it is only assumed that his interlocutors lack of philosophical training would be unable to follow an exposition of his thought processes, which could lead to misunderstandings. Plato held a substantive definition of the idea of ​​the good principle is quite possible. In his school, the Academy, the topic was discussed. Proponents of the view that there is an "unwritten teachings " of Plato, which is deducible only from hints that situate in the Republic Secretive there. Perhaps Plato was when he wrote the Politeia, not yet so far advanced in his discussion of the problem that he held beyond the parable Illustrative statements for ready for publication.

Reception

In ancient times, a number of thinkers have taken up the sun parable, interpreted or used in free way for their own purposes. Rezipiert it was, inter alia, of Philo of Alexandria, Plutarch, Alcinous, Celsus and Origen. Among the neo-Platonists were interested especially Plotinus and Proclus on the Parable.

Some Neo-Pythagoreans attended a seinstranszendentes highest principle. The Mittelplatoniker however, not took this route. They took not the consequence to locate the idea of ​​the good of being out of the sun above parable. Part they showed explicitly the range of beings to, partly can this classification inferred from their philosophical systems. Only in Neo-Platonism, the idea of ​​being transcendence of good prevailed. Plotinus, the founder of Neo-Platonism, went out with the support of his metaphysics of the Absolute, among others, from the sun parable. He called, following on from Plato's Parmenides, the seinstranszendente highest principle as " the One " and identified it with the good of sun parable. In this he was followed by the later Neoplatonists.

Greatly impressed by the sun parable was the humanist Marsilio Ficino. According to his understanding there must be other than the good which he equates with God the Father and called " sun of the Sun", and still give the visible sun, a third, invisible sun, whose image is the visible sun. The invisible sun he calls the first son of God, the visible second. The visible sun is for Ficino the "Vicar of God" in the sense world; through them God's pour goods into the region of the visible, its light flows forth from the invisible light of the unseen sun.

Text editions and translations

• Otto Apelt: Plato: The state ( = Otto Apelt (ed.): Plato: All dialogs, Vol 5). Meiner, Hamburg 1988, ISBN 3-7873-0920-9, pp. 260-265 (reprint of the 3rd edition Leipzig 1923; translation only )
• John Burnet (ed.): Platonis opera, Vol 4, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1902 ( critical edition without translation, and often reprinted )
• Heinrich Dorrie / Matthias Baltes ( Eds.): The Platonism in antiquity, Volume 4: The philosophical doctrine of Platonism. From man - Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1996, ISBN 3-7728-1156-6, pp. 80-85 ( source texts with translation ) and p 324-332 (comment)
• Gunther Eigler (ed.): Plato 's Politeia. The state ( = Plato works in eight volumes, Volume 4). 2nd edition, University Press, Darmstadt 1990, ISBN 3-534-11280-6, pp. 536-545 ( critical edition, edited by Dietrich short, Greek text by Émile Chambry, German translation by Friedrich Schleiermacher )
• Rüdiger Rufener (ed.): Plato: the state. Politeia. Artemis & Winkler, Dusseldorf and Zurich 2000, ISBN 3-7608-1717-3, pp. 548-557 (Greek text after the issuance of Émile Chambry without the critical apparatus, German translation by Rüdiger Rufener, introduction and notes by Thomas Alexander Szlezák )
• Wilhelm Wiegand: The State, Book VI -X. In: Plato: Complete Works, Volume 2, Lambert Schneider, Heidelberg without year ( 1950 ), pp. 205-407, here: 240-245 ( translation only )