Anatoliy Golitsyn

Anatoly Mikhailovich Golitsyn (also Golytsin and Golitsyn, Russian Анатолий Михайлович Голицын; born August 25, 1926 in Pyrjatyn in Ukraine) was a Soviet intelligence officer, most recently with the rank of major in the KGB and defectors.

Career

1946 Golitsyn entered the Ministerstwo Gosudarstwennoi Besopasnosti (Ministry for State Security ), the predecessor institution of Komitet Gossudarstwennoi Besopasnosti (KGB ), a. From 1950 to 1953 he worked in the so-called U.S. Department of the KGB counterintelligence. As of mid- 1953, he was employed as a resident in the Soviet Embassy in Vienna. During the preparation of the financial statements for the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955, and the previous part deduction of Soviet troops from occupied Austria, he was ordered back end of 1954 to Moscow.

After the KGB in 1958 promoted him to Major, he was an employee of the Department of PGU, which was responsible in particular for intelligence surveillance of NATO. In 1960, he was disguised as a message used Klimov Attaché in Helsinki.

Overflow 1961

When returning from a furlough, he fled with his wife and child on December 22, 1961 in the CIA Residentur in Helsinki. As a sign of his will, to convert, he revealed some of the first Soviet agents in Finland. After initially contradictory statements he led, without direct attribution, the CIA to track down the " top agent " of the KGB in the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) Heinz Felfe.

Then he was taken to further interrogations in the U.S. and there taught because of its detailed statements by the chief of the CIA counterintelligence officer James Jesus Angleton of the British intelligence services MI5 and MI6 to London, where he gave crucial evidence for unmasking of the double agent Kim Philby.

Here he betrayed the Soviet agent Anthony Blunt. After his identity was made public because of a newspaper report in the Daily Telegraph, he traveled for fear of assassination by the KGB back in the United States. There, he and his family was given a new identity under which this lived there ever since.

Information and consequences

Because of its complex personality and its increased tendency to self- representation supplied Golitsyn Angleton with a range of information that was made up of knowledge, half- knowledge and ignorance. The fact that many of his information were pure inventions, thus can be explained that he wanted to make sure him and his family the protection by the U.S. Secret Service and U.S. citizenship was granted.

For example, he revealed an alleged Soviet master plan that the KGB would use a variety of alleged Soviet defectors to conduct targeted disinformation to Western intelligence services. This, so the statement of Golitsyn, sold the "West" exclusively disinformation, so that the Soviet Union could thus gain world domination. These include such absurd assertions, such as that the Swedish political leader and later Prime Minister Olof Palme, but also the staff in the Department of State and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had been held by the KGB and strongly influenced. Furthermore, he was also a non- nominative indication of a KGB mole in the CIA. This internal agent was given the code name " Sascha "; the search for him paralyzed the American intelligence service for many years. The statement Golitsyn was the beginning of an operation as " Honetol " designated "witch hunt ", which lasted about 13 years, and suspected some hundreds of the best Soviet specialists at the CIA spying in their sequence and many were dismissed from the service. Also, almost every KGB defector was sent in the following years back home, because he was thought Golitsyn Thanks for a Desinformanten. The search for the phantom "Sasha " put almost all of the work against the Soviet Union lame and she was "the greatest trauma " of the Agency, once lamented the later CIA chief William Egan Colby. Set particular, an implementation to do Angleton to his agents abroad, any editing in terms of defectors from the Soviet Union, was one of the reasons why the CIA and thus the United States important preliminary information about the Soviet invasion of Prague in 1968, for the suppression of the Prague Spring, ultimately missing.