Anomalous monism

The anomalous monism is a position in philosophy of mind, which has been developed by Donald Davidson. It claims, first, that each mental event is identical to a single physical event. On the other hand explains the anomalous monism that types of mental events are not the same types of physical events. A single event s pain may therefore be identical with a physical event p. The event type "pain " to which s belongs, shall however not a general type of physical states.

The philosophy historical context

The anomalous monism is a position that tries to give an answer to the mind-body problem, ie the question of the nature of mental states or events. One of the classic positions on this question is the identity theory. According to her, mental events are nothing more than neuronal events. This is the "Event " means an event type and not just an event token meant. The distinction between token and type is easy to understand: A token is a single incident, while same token form a Type. But therefore the number series 100101 contains 6 digits token only 2 digits types. Since the classical identity theory assumes a type identity, she claims that a person whenever it is about pain in the state, is also located in the same neural state.

At the classical identity theory of the 50s of the 20th century criticism has been practiced early. Hilary Putnam argued about 1967 that the identity theory is empirically wrong, which he founded with the famous argument of multiple realization. In response to the problems of the alternative positions identity theory developed in seventies. While Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor and other formulated functionalism, Donald Davidson developed the anomalous monism. In contrast to functionalism Davidson's rejection of the identity theory, however, is based less on the multiple realization, as on assumptions about rationality.

Davidson will no dualism represented, even though he is of the opinion that can not be mental event types to reduce neural event types. His solution is as follows: Even if the types are not identical to each other, yet every single mental event - each token - identical to a physical event. Such a position is often understood as a nichtreduktiver materialism, although some critics, such as Jaegwon Kim (Kim, 1996) doubt that the anomalous monism is at all a materialistic position.

The central argument for the anomalous monism

In his classic essay " Mental Events " ( Davidson, 1980), in 1970, Donald Davidson reaches the anomalous monism about three seemingly incompatible assumptions:

These three assumptions seem to contradict each other, since 2 and 3, the negation of 1 seem to imply, 1 and 2, the negation of 3, the assumptions 1 and 3 again the negation of 2 Da Davidson, however, holds all three assumptions to be true, tried he develop a position that is all assumptions justice. This is his opinion of anomalous monism.

The anomalous monism interprets the assumptions 1 and 3 as follows:

This is true 1 *, since each mental event is identical with a physical event, and also in the sense of Assumption 2 is exposed as a physical event under a strict law of nature. This assumption makes the monistic also part of Davidson's philosophy. But even if every mental event as physical event falls under a strict law of nature, there are no general psychological or psychophysical laws. Due to this thesis Davidson calls his philosophy " anomalous " - from " Prefecture " the law.

Davidson's central argument for the anomalous monism thus has the form of an inference to the best explanation: The assumptions 1-3 are true. Only if the anomalous monism is true, it can be explained how the assumptions 1 - 3 may be true. So the Anomalous monism is true.

Interaction

The first assumption of Davidson's central argument is that cause mental and physical events are mutually exclusive. This assumption has a highly intuitive plausibility, since this corresponds to the ideas of everyday life. It seems as self-evident that anxiety ( mental event ) can cause an escape ( physical event ). Nevertheless, there are philosophical positions that deny the interaction between mental and physical events. This explains about the epiphenomenalism that mental events can cause physical events and the eliminative materialism denies any interaction, since he claims that there are no mental states in reality.

More important than these conflicts, however, doubt whether the anomalous monism can be self-righteous, the first assumption. Thus, the objection raised against Davidson repeatedly that his position is tantamount to a form of self- epiphenomenalism. Finally, mental events can be just as physical events causes. For mental events as mental events, however, no causal role left but. Therefore, it is sometimes even argued that not clear whether in the context of anomalous monism even matter for mental events stay left. Rather, one could cut through the unreduced but causally ineffective mental event types. In this sense, the position of Davidson's run against her will to a form of eliminative materialism addition.

Strict laws

The second assumption Davidson said that events that cause each other, fall under a strict law of nature. Amazingly, Davidson has for decades this controversial assumption provided without explicitly argue for them. Only in the essay Laws and Cause of 1995, he has tried to justify this assumption. Davidson argues here that strict laws are a conceptual consequence of the concept of causation between physical events. However, it is usually denied that this is sufficient as a justification of the controversial assumption. Overall it is well to recognize that Davidson sees more than justified intuitively the second assumption.

This is surprising, since it seems by no means clear that causality always presupposes strict laws. So everyday causal clauses are not always strictly observed. The phrase " smoking caused their cancer " is about not assume that there is a strict law that from smoking leads to cancer. Davidson's reply to this objection is, but that there were strict physical laws that led to lung cancer from smoking. But the question of strict laws even at the level of basic physical events remains controversial. So there is a renaissance in the philosophy of science of indeterministic conceptions as they have been formulated about Nancy Cartwright. Davidson has responded to this objection by declaring that strict and deterministic laws are not the same ( Davidson, 1980, p 216). But It remains the question whether Davidson can find a reasonable explanation of "strict ", the third assumption - makes plausible - there are no strict laws about mental.

The abnormality of the mental

The third assumption of Davidson's central argument was that there is no strict scientific laws about mental events. This thesis of the anomaly of the mental has triggered extensive philosophical debates. Davidson's thesis is not that there can be no psychological or psychophysical laws principle. Of course, there are those, such as " If anyone is thirsty, he drinks some " or " If someone cuts his finger, he feels pain ." But Davidson also wants to ensure that such laws always have a ceteris paribus character only and never strict laws of nature are such as Newton's law of gravity.

However, the thesis of the abnormality of the mind presupposes the falsity of the type identity theory. Should this be true, there would namely strict psychophysical laws of the form M iff N, where "M" would stand for a mental event types and "N " for a neural event types. Davidson's argument for the abnormality of the mind, therefore, amounts to a critique of the classical (type ) identity theory. It is not always clear how Davidson's argument runs, which has led to different interpretations in the literature. Undisputed, however, that Davidson ascribes the mental characteristics should make strict psychophysical laws implausible, and that two of the key characteristics according to Davidson, rationality and holism of the mental.

The rationality argument

Davidson's reflections on rationality are closely linked to his broader philosophy of language and epistemological arguments. If you want to a people ascribe beliefs, one must, according to Davidson by principle of charity ( " principle of benevolent interpretation" ) imply that the person has predominantly true and rational beliefs. Unlike an understanding would be unthinkable.

One possible reading of Davidson's argument now looks like this: The principle of charity has the consequence that a belief ascription can always be revised in light of further evidence on the belief system of a person. Suppose there is a strict law that a conviction Ü leads to physical state P. If one ascribes the light of further write-ups conviction of a person no longer Ü, then you should you not award more P. But this was absurd, since opinions about physical states can not in principle be subject to revision by findings about beliefs.

The holistic argument

Davidson's argument for the abnormality of the mind also refers to his thesis of holism of the mental. This theory states that a person can not alone ascribe a single mental event, but a mental event always already presupposes other mental events. For example, a person may believe that they will receive a tax refund, only under the condition that she has other beliefs. You need to know about what money is and must believe that they have an account, on which repayment shall be paid.

Now Davidson argues as follows: Premise 1 ) Mental events can in principle be done only under the condition of other mental events. Premise 2 ) Neural events can happen without other mental events in principle. Premise 3) If Premise 1 and Premise 2 are true, then are mental and neural events are not identical. Conclusion: Mental and neural events are not identical.

Perspective and criticism

On the anomalous monism criticism is voiced from different perspectives. Firstly, it is doubtful that Davidson's arguments for the anomaly of the mental are successful. Another point of criticism concerns the question of how a token identity without type identity is to be understood at all. If the token identity is true, a single physical event p1 falls under the mental event type " blue perception ," while another physical event p2 does not fall under these types of events. Now it seems however to be no answer to the anomalous monism why this is the case. Finally, should the physical events that realize the blue perceptions have no physical property in common - otherwise they would fall under a common physical type. Also in the context of anomalous monism, the problem of qualia, ie the question of how it can be that certain neural processes associated with experiencing Finally remains unsolved.

All this has meant that the anomalous monism indeed is considered an important position in the philosophy of mind, but is not usually regarded as the solution to the mind-body problem. In addition, the anomalous monism has always remained very closely associated with Donald Davidson as position and was taken up and developed by relatively few philosophers. However, as the neuroscientist Gerhard Roth confesses to a position within the meaning Davidsons.