Eliminative materialism
The eliminative materialism eliminativism or is a controversial position within the philosophy of mind. His central thesis is that the everyday speech be wrong about mental states. A future neuro- or cognitive scientific description of the people will not only replace folk psychology, but also to demonstrate that there was no mental states.
- 3.1 Intuitive reservations
- 3.2 The Inkohärenzeinwand
- 3.3 Qualia
- 5.1 Eliminativistische literature
- 5.2 Eliminativismuskritische literature
The development of the eliminative materialism
The eliminative materialism was first developed in the 1960s and is in sharp contrast to classical positions of the philosophy of mind. Even René Descartes, who formulated a philosophy of methodical doubt, kept the existence of the mental inner world for sure. Only CD Broad drew in his 1925 published work The Mind and Its Place in Nature, the possibility of eliminative materialism briefly considered, but rejected it as implausible.
The development of the eliminative materialism stands in a close relation with the beginning of the history of science as seen in the philosophy of science as it has been initiated by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. One result of this new perspective was the recognition that scientific progress often not as yet been adopted in the positivist models, proceeds through reductions. The history of science shows that the old theories often on the new theories are not recyclable, but this does not mean that contradictory theories continue to exist side by side in the long term. Rather, the old theories are simply given up and recognized their falsehood. Examples are the responsibility of the geocentric worldview, the phlogiston theory or the belief in witchcraft. The thesis of eliminative materialists now is that the ordinary theory of mental states will prove equally as wrong. It is characterized by outdated Cartesian prejudice and completely incompatible with the recent findings of brain research.
Early formulations of the eliminative materialism are those of Richard Rorty and Paul Feyerabend. These approaches were outspoken outsider positions that were based on more general considerations for theory change and for many philosophers had an unacceptable close to relativism. This situation changed in the 80 years through the work of Paul Churchland, Patricia Churchland and Stephen down. These three philosophers tried eliminativistische approaches with the modern neuroscience or cognitive science results to join.
Many critics of eliminativism is considered to be a threatening theory whose truth would have terrible consequences. Jerry Fodor says about:
In contrast, Eliminativisten keep their thesis rather commendable. They argue that a neuro- scientifically based vocabulary will lead to a better understanding of man and his problems.
Arguments for eliminative materialism
The theory argument
Starting point of all eliminativistischen positions is the thesis that it was in the everyday notions of mental states to a theory that - like any other theory also - is in principle falsifiable. This theory is supported in the literature generally folk psychology or called folk psychology. If folk psychology would now be falsified, it could turn out that the concepts of folk psychology is in fact refer to anything. For example, in the world would the terms "thought" or "soul" just a little something correspond to how the term " crystal sphere ".
In particular, the Churchlands have several arguments developed to show that folk psychology is a false theory and abolition ripe. Thus, they argue that were not explained by the folk psychology many phenomena that could be studied and explained by modern neuroscience. Examples include mental illness, learning or memory skills. In addition, the folk psychology have not progressed substantially in the last 2500 years and was thus a millennia stagnant theory. Finally, already had had a folk psychology at a comparable level by the ancient Greeks. In contrast, the neurosciences are a rapidly developing science complex, which could explain many cognitive skills already, to which folk psychology do not have access.
Basically, the Churchland's opinion is folk psychology even since the first scientific developments on the retreat: In the earliest companies to still trying to explain all natural phenomena with the attribution of mental states: The sea was angry that sun tired. Gradually these folk psychological explanations have been replaced by more powerful scientific descriptions. Now assume there is no reason to make before our brains stop and not to accept a more powerful, scientific description of cognitive abilities. If we had such a statement, we needed a folk psychological explanation of behavior any more than a declaration of the sea behavior. Both represent atavistic thinking.
Against the theory of argument put forward by nichteliminativistischer page two types of objections. On the one hand it is argued that folk psychology is a quite successful theory. On the other doubts that the everyday understanding of the mind can ever comprehend than theory. Jerry Fodor is one of the philosophers who have emphasized the success of folk psychology (Lit.: Fodor, 1987). They enable in an extremely effective way to communicate in daily life; Appointments, scheduling, etc., could be carried about in a few words. Such efficiency can never be achieved with a complex neuro- scientific terminology. Another argument of the Churchlands was that folk psychology phenomena such as mental illness or many memory processes could not explain. This argument is opposed by Antieliminativisten, that it is not the task of folk psychology is to explain these phenomena as well. It is therefore a pure Topics confusion when you accusatory because of these " defects ".
Arguments against eliminative materialism
Intuitive reservations
The thesis of eliminative materialism seems so obvious many critics to be wrong, that was not necessary any more argument. You only had to honestly ask yourself to know that you have mental states. Eliminative materialists argue against such a rejection of their position that intuitions often led to quite false images of reality. Here, too, are again offering analogies from the history of science at: It may seem obvious that the sun revolves around the earth, but with all its apparent obviousness, this concept has yet been proven wrong. Analog: It may seem obvious that there still are in addition to the neural events mental states, yet this could prove to be incorrect.
But even if one accepts the error rate of our intuitions, can the objection to eliminative materialism rephrase: If the existence of mental states seems perfectly obvious and central, in our worldview, then it took enormously strong arguments for the existence of mental states to successfully deny. However, it seems that the arguments for eliminativism are not nearly strong enough to force this. Therefore, there is no reason to believe in the eliminative materialism. However, this argument is of course a certain evaluation of eliminativistischen arguments ahead and the predisposition to be determined his worldview of faith and intuition.
The Inkohärenzeinwand
Some critics confine itself to argue that the eliminative materialism is an implausible position. Others, however, argue that he was incoherent, since it must ultimately assume what he wants to deny: When the Eliminativist says that there are no mental states, then he must assume that his words have meaning, are justified and true. Now, the terms " meaning" be, " reason" and "truth" but understandable only in terms of intentional mental states. If there are no beliefs but only neural occurrences exist in the world, so there would be no meaningful conditions that are true or justified. Since the Eliminativist his thesis, however, ascribes meaning and it holds true and justified, he implicitly put forward what he actually deny - mental states.
A Eliminativist can respond to this objection by claiming either that meanings, reasons and truth could be explained without mental states, or he argues that he could get along without these elements. Critics agree, however, that the Eliminativist the proof of these assertions still fails.
Qualia
As a further problem for the eliminative materialism is true, the fact that people are experiencing beings, so have qualia. Since qualia are generally regarded as properties of mental states, their existence does not seem to be compatible with eliminativism. In fact, eliminative materialists reject therefore also from Qualia. This is problematic, since the existence of qualia seems perfectly obvious. Therefore, many philosophers hold a Qualiaeliminativismus for implausible, if not incomprehensible. You agree that about the existence of pain experience is simply not to be denied.
The classic formulation of the Qualiaeliminativismus comes from Daniel Dennett (Lit.: Dennett 1988). Dennett admits that the existence of qualia seems obvious. Nevertheless, he claims that " qualia " is a theoretical concept, the food from an outdated metaphysics and Cartesian intuitions. A precise analysis shows that the term was full of contradictions and ultimately inane in itself. Dennett's argument is usually invoked against that it is indeed likely that you have false beliefs about qualia, but that this does not prove that it does not exist Qualia.
Impact on the psychology
According to the eliminative materialism we come to the explanation and treatment of mental malfunction much further, if we look for anatomical defects or abnormalities in the brain, according to functional disturbances of physiology, according to biochemical changes in brain metabolism and for genetic damage or impairment of brain development. For example, the effect of psychotherapy that are based on folk psychology, eliminativism estimated from as low.