Reason (argument)

By the term " reason " (Greek arché, AITIA, Latin principium, Eng. Reasonable ) in the most general sense of the word is everything that is what one "Why?", "How? ", " What? " Answers to the question. This refers to a factual or temporal Former by which a fact or thereafter shall specify.

In today's German, the word " reason " both the meaning of justification as well as the foundation and basis of. The same word is used in various languages ​​to both the reason and the reason to call (from the Greek "logos", Latin "ratio" and its derived expressions in the Romance languages ​​and in English ).

In philosophical parlance, the term " basic " ambiguously used and is very difficult from the adjacent terms " cause" and "principle" to delineate. Often a distinction is made in the tradition between the real reasons and reasons of knowledge. In today's parlance we speak of cause, if the objective reason of what is justified by it's different, while is usually referred to with reason in the strict sense today of the knowledge base.

The problem of the reason can be discussed according to various methodological aspects. A key factor here is mainly an ontological and an epistemological point of view.

Conceptual history

In the early days of European philosophy, the term " basic " ( arché ) is characterized by a plurality not yet differentiated meaning components. In the original mythical thought meant arché something that is present in all parts of a being and constitutes its unit; so that it came close to the meaning of what would later be called material cause. In Anaximander takes the causal component of arché to the fore when he perceives as that from which emerge the concrete things, what is happening " controls " and thereby gives it its character of necessity. Aristotle used for " basic ", the two terms of similar meaning arché (best in Aristotle with "principle" translate ) and AITIA (cause). As for the causes he distinguishes the material ( material cause ), shape ( causa formalis ), active ( efficient cause ) and final cause ( causa finalis ), which are all in different ways "reasons" for the respective beings. Principles are " the first where something is or is or is not recognized " (Met V 18f. ). Aristotle makes the distinction between reasons of being ( later ratio essendi ), becoming (ratio fiendi ) and cognition ( ratio cognoscendi ), at the still oriented Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff. Christian August Crusius Since the reasons of being and becoming in the Germans were referred to as " real reasons ".

Grounds of cognition

Finding reasons are reasons that the truth claim of a particular within a Statement of reasons - to support the judgment - theoretical or practical. This can be other than true accepted judgments ( 1), or the judged facts itself (2). The most severe form of the first case is the proof, in which the established set of other, accepted as true sentences is concluded logically. In many cases, however, are weaker reasons such as compliance with the judgment of a competent person or a tradition. In the second case there is justification by the use of evidence, ie the unequivocal self-manifestation of a thing. Thus, for Aristotle, the first principles, once you have understood it, immediately evident.

Sometimes the (inductive ) confirmation of hypotheses is considered as a kind of judgment - justification. The hypothesis supporting empirical data are then reported as " reason " for accepting the hypothesis in question.

In practical judgments give reasons for decisions. This is done so that that which was the subject of the decision in question, proved to be a necessary means to an end and that purpose is stated as an objective of the action is being taken under the circumstances for the purpose of settlement evidence to complete.

In philosophy since David Hume and Immanuel Kant outweighs the view that there are different types of reasons for theoretical and practical reasons. The main factor is already taken by David Hume distinction between beliefs and desires. While theoretical grounds beliefs are justified, which must be checked on the basis of empirical data, ultimately, justify practical reasons for actions. In addition to these beliefs and desires play a role, not amenable to further rational criticism more.

Argumentation theory

Stephen Toulmin, one of the pioneers of modern argumentation theory, in 1958 an Anglo -American common justification scheme developed in which one of a base (English: Ground, Evidence or Data) with a transition rule ( ' Warrant ') to a conclusion ( Claim) arrives. The plan submitted in the same year French-language standard work of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts - Tyteca used a much broader concept of the reason, in addition to data and facts also allows values ​​.

In the Informal logic a reason contains a premise and a (sometimes hidden ) co- premise, which together are suitable to achieve the thesis. The pragma - dialectics with its formalized analysis technique colloquial discussions is often attributed to this region of the argumentation theory.

When German philosopher Harald well Rapp, the reason in an argument from an epistemic basis of proven orientations. This is open to reasonable re- evaluations of existing opinion in expository course of action.

Real reasons

In the Aristotelian- scholastic tradition, the real reasons are identical to the four causes mentioned by Aristotle. Starting from the question of how change is possible, was distinguished between internal and external causes or interchangeably between being and becoming reasons. As internal causes while the material and formal cause were distinguished that are in a complementary relationship. The material cause was perceived as the principle of change, the formal cause as the principle of identity. As well, the two complementary external causes were considered - the efficient cause as the principle that brings a change in motion, the final cause is happening as the goal, the way this change.

Since David Hume sat down in the empiricist, and later in the positivist mindset more and more convinced by that of causes only could hardly be considered as active causes. The existing between cause and effect relationship has been interpreted only as a regular sequence, which is thought in the sense of Kant only in the human mind as causality.