Stephen Stich

Stephen Stich ( born May 9, 1943) is an American professor of philosophy and cognitive science. He currently teaches (2012 ) at Rutgers University in New Jersey and also has an honorary professorship at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Sheffield held. Stitch versatile work that extends from the philosophy of mind about the epistemology to ethics, was honored in 2007 with the Jean Nicod Prize.

Academic Career

Stephen studied engraving from 1960 to 1964 at the University of Pennsylvania Philosophy, where he graduated with a BA ( summa cum laude with distinction ). After subsequently further four years at Princeton University, he received his doctorate same place in 1968. This was followed by teaching at several universities, so among other things, the City University of New York ( CUNY ), the University of Michigan, the University of Maryland and the University of California, San Diego.

Since 1998, researches and teaches engraving at Rutgers University philosophy and cognitive science.

Work

In terms of the fundamental question of philosophy of mind, namely that according to the fundamental nature of human consciousness, Stephen stitch is classified as a materialist. For instance, caused his book from 1983, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief, not least a great stir, as his argument ions and conclusions here are far beyond materialism - seemed to go out and - as well as the more stringent physicalism accordingly, much more than a defense of Eleminativen were understood materialism. However at last since the publication of his book Deconstructing the Mind in 1996, engraving modified his position in this respect and perspective that he can no longer adequate without another near classic Eleminitavisten, such as Paul and Patricia Churchland, or Daniel Dennett, situates.

However stitch is just Dennett continues in many points close, such as in the categorical rejection of the possibility that non-human animals - the other primates included - probability guesses entertain (read: think ) could. According to stitch this therefore is already impossible, since we can not ascribe ( or rather just empty ) propositional attitudes nonhuman animals, without filling them with concrete (ie, each believed ) and at all writable content. This very writability fails according to him, to the likely absence of a natural language on the part of non-human animals. A skepticism which he also shares with Donald Davidson. What Stephen Stitch, however, is different and is reflected in particular in his book The Fragmentation of Reason (1990 ) by many philosophers and philosophers of the Anglo-Saxon area, is a general skepticism about the traditional instruments and methods of analytic philosophy, where he alternatively a pragmatic oriented epistemic relativism offers.

Stephen stitch recent work ( as in Mind Reading, 2003) treated include the theory of mind, that is the main question, as it is human at all possible, to be able to infer the mental processes and states in other people and to interpret them.

Publications (selection)

  • Grammar, Psychology and Indeterminacy. Journal of Philosophy. LXIX, 22, 1972.
  • Empiricism, innateness and Linguistic Universals. Philosophical Studies. Vol 33, No. 3, 1978.
  • Beliefs and sub- Doxastic States. Philosophy of Science, Vol 45, No. 4, 1978.
  • Do Animals Have Beliefs? The Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Vol 57, No. 1, 1979.
  • From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press (ISBN 0262690926 ), 1983.
  • Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives. Vol 4, 1990.
  • The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation. MIT Press (ISBN 0262691590 ), 1990.
  • What Is a Theory of Mental Representation? Mind. Vol 101, no. 402, 1992.
  • Naturalizing Epistemology: Quine, Simon and the Prospects for Pragmatism. in C. Hookway & D. Peterson: Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Royal Institute of Philosophy, Supplement no. 34, 1993 articles online.
  • Deconstructing the Mind. Oxford University Press ( ISBN 0195126661 ) 1996 1 Chapter online.
  • The Flight to Reference, or How Not to Make Progress in the Philosophy of Science. ( with Michael Bishop), Philosophy of Science. Vol 65, No. 1 articles online in 1998.
  • Theory Theory to the Max ( with Shaun Nichols ), in Mind and Language. Vol 13, No. 3 articles online, 1998.
  • Jackson's Empirical Assumptions. ( with Jonathan Weinberg), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol 62, No. 3 articles online, 2001.
  • Mind Reading. ( with Shaun Nichols ), Oxford University Press ( ISBN 0198236107 ), 2003.
  • Two Theories about the Cognitive Architecture Underlying Morality. ( with Daniel Kelley ), Online Philosophy Conference. , 2006.
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