Lathen train collision

The Transrapid Lathen accident was the collision of a magnetic levitation on 22 September 2006 at the Transrapid Test Facility Emsland in Lathen on a repair vehicle. 23 people died and ten others were injured. This was the most serious accident a monorail around the world.

Starting position

A driven with diesel engine repair truck, which was occupied by two workers, was for the daily morning cleaning work on the one-lane test track. After completion of the work he drove around 9:30 clock to support 120 of the route. Here was a crossover that leads to the parking area. The vehicle was waiting for permission from the control center to be allowed to enter the parking area. The crew asked by radio when they could enter, but received no response from the console.

The Transrapid 08 should sail with a group of visitors this morning the test track. The facility was a daily attraction with about 1000 visitors. The journey took ten minutes and cost 18 euros. All 31 passengers this trip were members, guests or employees of the Transrapid operating company IABG and drove for free: 11 staff and two apprentices of RWE, a supplier company IABG, nine members of the aged care service in Papenburg, a couple at the invitation of an employee of the operating company and some of their employees. About nine clock boarded the train attendants and three visitors. A train conductor took place in front, and two more in the last car, the trolley, because every ride the Transrapid was evaluated. The first tour of the day was always driven with 170 km / h instead of a potential 450 km / h. At 9:43 clock the train from the platform drove off. The Transrapid made ​​then first of a planned emergency braking and came up to a stop - a security measure. Now he waited for the driver's license.

At 9:52 clock the control center turned off the power to the road ahead is clear. The control center was occupied by two dispatchers, security consisted essentially in the four-eyes principle. One gave the driver by radio the license. This drove off. The acceleration of the vehicle was significant.

The accident

The dispatcher had forgotten that the repair truck was still on the track, and previously also failed to provide the corresponding road section, as prescribed, to lock the Transrapid. 57 seconds after launch at 9:53 clock someone pressed the emergency brake. 25 meters later the train with 162 km / h collided with the vehicle workshop. Why the driver had seen on the perfectly straight line repair trucks in the track not previously remained unexplained. The impact could be heard. The magnetic levitation, constructed of lightweight construction, buried itself under the 60 -tonne workshop trolley and levered him up. The roof of the Transrapid at the Zugspitze was demolished in the process of compressing the vehicle under the workshop trolley. About 300 meters further, the splined wreck slid across the track before it came to a halt.

Follow

Because of the collision, 23 people died and eleven others were injured. The workshop trolley and the front part of the maglev were completely destroyed. The two workers in a repair truck survived, albeit injured because they were on the side facing away from the impact side of their vehicle. They heard knocking at their vehicle: some passengers in the front part of the train had survived the impact. The men screwed onto the bottom plate of the vehicle and were able to rescue three passengers. In the back pulling part survived the two board technicians, and in cutting up the wreck with welding torches three other survivors were found.

The control center immediately called the plant fire brigade. A quarter of an hour after the collision arrived the first emergency personnel. 200 rescuers were finally in use. To 22 clock, the work was completed. The Unfallzug was then recovered between the 6th and 8th of November. After the accident, the pilot operation rested until July 2008.

The prosecutor's office was investigating the two Dispatchers of the control center, against two managers of the test track and against two directors of the operating company for negligent homicide and negligent assault. Against the driver could not be determined because he was killed in the accident. The cause was human error. The prosecution relied mainly on advice from the Federal Railway Authority and the Technical University of Braunschweig. In May 2008, the district court sentenced the two Osnabrück manager to pay fines in the amount of 24,000 and 20,000 euros, because they had the infrastructure barriers not sufficiently clearly defined. The criminal case against the ever guilty of the prosecution 's view dispatcher was stopped because he was not fit to stand trial.

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