Logical atomism

The Logical atomism was an influential in the 20s and 30s of the 20th century direction within analytic philosophy. He claims that the analysis of ordinary sets leads to an underlying ideal, logical language whose sentences are in an imaging relationship to atomic facts (or facts).

• 5.1 Russell
• 5.2 Wittgenstein
• 5.3 Further

Origins

The term goes back to a paper by Bertrand Russell in 1911. A wider audience the idea of ​​logical atomism however, were only with lectures, the Russell 1918 held and published as The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Much influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein Russell was, he explicitly recognizes, in an introductory note. In fact, the influence of Wittgenstein, who was from 1911 to 1914 until his pupil, then been his friend, so great that Russell had left a manuscript of 1913 due to the criticism of Wittgenstein, especially on the theory of judgment, unfinished and unpublished. This manuscript, under the title Theory of Knowledge appeared in the "Collected Papers" in 1984, may be regarded as the true manifesto of logical atomism.

In the 90s of the 19th century, Russell was still in the tradition of British idealism, by people such as Bernard Bosanquet, TH Green, H.H. Joachim and especially by F.H. Bradley was coined. Together with G. E. Moore, he broke away from this school, and, as he recalls in My Mental Development, " with a sense of escaping from prison, we allowed ourselves to think did grass is green, did the sun and stars would exist if no one aware what of them ... ". The logical atomism must therefore be seen as a conscious departure from the monistic and idealistic ideas of his teacher.

The doctrine

Russell calls his teaching atomistic, in contrast to the monistic logic " of the people who more or less follow Hegel " (PLA 178) and logical, since he wishes to encounter in the analysis in a logical, not physical objects (PLA 179)

The first assertion of the logical atomism is that the world "facts" contains. The facts are complex structures consisting of objects ( " Particulars "). He defines objects as "terms of relations in atomic facts" (PLA 199) A fact consists either of an object with a simple property or of different objects that are in a simple relation to each other. There are also judgments ( " Beliefs "), which are related to the facts and by this relationship are either true or false.

Relations are external to Russell, which means that a relational proposition in general can not be traced back to a subject-predicate proposition. That was the position Bradleys and idealism ', and after Russell's conviction also that of Leibniz. One consequence of the doctrine of internal relations was thus that the relation is a predicate already in the object, and thus that " everything with everything " related. External relations, however, allow the common-sense view that some facts can be independent of others.

Even ordinary objects of daily life " are apparently complex entities". Names are the words for Particulars. For Russell, the words such as "this" and " that". In contrast, common names such as " Socrates " for Russell are actually descriptions that need to be replaced in the analysis such as by "The teacher of Plato ". Russell had this as part of his Theory of Descriptions ( Theory of Descriptions ) required in 1905 ( in On Denoting ) and that should respond to the problem of non-existing objects into confrontation with Alexius Meinong, about who may be talking still worthwhile. ( Wittgenstein still takes in a remark of the Philosophical Investigations reference to where the example of the sword Excalibur, he explains the problem ( PI § 39) ). The theory of descriptions is the extent of the logical atomism of central importance, as Russell believed to show her that ordinary language must be analyzed to disclose the true structure. To some extent this is also true for his Theory of Types with which he met the Russell's antinomy.

Another element in Russell's logical atomism is the theory of acquaintance ( Theory of Acquaintance ). Russell felt obliged to postulate a special kind of relation which guarantees that a subject can have views of reality: " I think the relation of subject and object in presentation 'may be Identified with the relation Which I call ' acquaintance. '" (1914 On the Nature of Acquaintance 169) to the objects of acquaintance he also scored Logical constants ("and ", "or " etc.), but also n-ary relations ( TK 97-101 ). The acquaintance he considers a prerequisite for the understanding of logical propositions.

All meaningful phrases, the gist of the logical atomism, are truth-functions of elementary propositions, the tautologies and contradictions occupy a special position, is so far given the truth of which a priori. (PLA 210)

Method

His decision to pluralism and relations, Russell says that he met on empirical grounds, because he had become convinced that the a priori arguments to the contrary are false. (Logical Atomism 339 ). " The Business of philosophy, as I conceive it, is Essentially did of logical analysis, Followed by logical synthesis. " (LA 341 ) It should "inferred entities ' shall be replaced by" logical constructions ". This " method" of logical atomism, to the strict application of Occam's razor belonged, may have had more than the metaphysical content influence on analytic philosophy. Russell sums it up this way: " [T ] here are Fewer things in heaven or earth than are dreamed on in our philosophy. " (PLA 260)

Metaphysical atomism versus Epistemological

At the time when Russell gave his lectures on logical atomism, he had lost contact with Wittgenstein for several years. After the First World War, Russell met but with Wittgenstein again and was crucial assist, Wittgenstein's version of the logical atomism to publish the Tractatus.

Although Wittgenstein does not use the term logical atomism, but almost all outlined positions are also found in the Tractatus, with which, however, as mentioned, crucial exception of the theory of judgment. (T 5.4 and 5.5541 ) (1918 Russell, however, was already moved away from this position. ) Nevertheless, the Tractatus differed so fundamentally from the philosophy of Russell that Wittgenstein misunderstood felt by his old teacher, and even against the inclusion of Russell's preface to the work was.

The differences relate to many details, but the key difference is in a fundamentally different understanding of the task of philosophy. While Russell ultimately stood in the tradition of British empiricism, Wittgenstein, at least in the Tractatus, a continental approach, which is grounded in rationalism. This is already formally, the sentences of the Tractatus obtained by the numbering system a weight, which further enhances the content apodictic tone. By Russell is a statement like that Wittgenstein in the preface, the truth of the thoughts that was unassailable and definitive unthinkable. Russell is ultimately about epistemological foundations, Wittgenstein therefore, point to the "limits of the world", and that is the metaphysical conditions of the possibility of language and truth declared. As knowledge is concretely possible, Wittgenstein seems hardly interested. That is why, for example, is the question of the nature of the items for Wittgenstein, of little interest. The question of how many things there is to decide in principle empirically for Russell, Wittgenstein, however, lacks the question every sense. The possibility of external relations for Russell is a prerequisite for the possibility of independent facts, for Wittgenstein, but all issues are independent, since he can so construct by any combinations of elementary propositions all possible worlds.

For Wittgenstein, propositions of metaphysics, ethics, etc. were essentially meaningless, Russell believed, however, with meta-languages ​​to thoroughly talk about the thought of Wittgenstein, it "show" only.

Although Wittgenstein and Russell jointly developed the Logical atomism, one can say that they were so far apart with their respective positions that they never found a common language again.

Influence

The immediate impact of the Tractatus was immense, especially by the reception he received by the Vienna Circle. However, it would not be an exaggeration to note that this influence was based in large part on misunderstandings, for example, as regards the nature of the elementary propositions. The indirect influence of the method, however, was the long run perhaps even greater. The fact that Russell has changed his views very often, it's almost impossible, except in individual technical aspects to attach a philosophy Russell. He has therefore left no school. But it is the willingness to face their own positions always questioning, and take criticism and implement, has for Analytic Philosophy is still a role model.

Wittgenstein's later philosophy is not least a confrontation with his early views. He is so far the history of philosophy his own successor. An important part of philosophical inquiry concerned for example with the private language argument, which leads back to Bertrand Russell, who said: "A perfect logical language ... would be very Largely private to one speaker. " (PLA 198)

The database expert and computer science pioneer Hartmut Wedekind considers the use of multiple predictors in an elementary proposition of Paul Lorenzen and Edgar F. Codd's introduction into the relational databases to overcome the logical atomism.