Lon L. Fuller

Its quite important philosophical work is The Morality of Law (1st edition 1964, 2nd revised edition, 1969), in which he - in this case the critical theses of the philosophy of law HLA Harts reflective - the relationship between law and morality discussed. Lon Fuller was professor of Law at Harvard University. Very famous was a published in 1958 in the Journal of the Harvard Law Review debate between him and HLA Hart, containing ( represented by Lon Fuller) already the main messages of the modern debate between legal positivism ( represented in the debate by HLA Hart) and the doctrine of natural law. The most famous student Fuller from his time as a lecturer at Harvard University, is the American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, whose own legal philosophy Fuller greatly influenced. In addition to his employment with the philosophy of law topics, Lon Fuller operated as Vertragsrechtler.

Life

Fuller was the son of a bank clerk. In 1906 his family moved from Texas to California. Fuller studied from 1919 Law and Economics in Berkeley (up to 1920) and Stanford ( 1920-1926 ), from which he graduated in 1926 with a doctorate in law. His academic career as a lecturer, he began in 1926 at the Oregon School of Law. He then held professorships at the University of Illinois and from 1931 to 1939 at Duke Law School. At Duke Law School one of his students was the future U.S. President Richard Nixon. After he was already 1939/1940 been a visiting professor there, Fuller was awarded in 1940 a professorship at Harvard University, where he taught until his death in 1978.

Work

The core of the philosophical work of Lon Fuller's quite makes his critique of HLA Hart represented variant of legal positivism. Fuller represents - in contrast to Hart - the thesis of a necessary conceptual connection between law and morality. In the context of a fictional story about a so-called King Rex Fuller leads in his work, The Morality of Law eight of his view for all legal systems fundamental problems. King Rex tries to be a legislator, but then always fails at his task, to adopt binding and substantive rules of law when it adopts "laws" that suffer from one of the following eight issues:

Fuller draws from the tragic efforts of King Rex, the following conclusions: It is the purpose of the law, human behavior in the reign of certain rules ( " rules" ) align. Each of the eight fundamental problems listed corresponds to a corresponding legislative principle, which serves to avoid those fundamental problems. If even one of these principles is violated permanently by the legislator, the legal system in question lose its status as a legal system. The more a legal system orienting themselves to the eight principles, the more it corresponds to the ideal of a legal system. However, Fuller admits that in practice no actual legal system is consistent with the ideal image, but every legal system at any point compromise on one or more of the eingehe mentioned principles. These principles form According to Fuller, the person designated by him as "internal morality of law" ( "inner morality of law" ). Would laws strictly aligned to the principles that this automatically means that on the laws adopted would just laws.

H.L.A. Hart criticized in his review of the work The Morality of Law chosen by Fuller designation of the eight principles as the "internal morality of law" ( "the internal morality of law" ). The principles are inadequate to achieve the objective of Fuller morality of law, since it was not a question of moral principles, but merely directed to an effective legislative principles. Positive is noted that Fuller would have brought a legal ethical justification of traditional elements of the rule of law in mind: to ensure the autonomy of man. Why this is a right value, and whether there were substantive standards for their use, however, remain unanswered at Fuller.

Writings (selection )

  • Positivism and Fidelity to the Law. A Reply to Professor Hart. In: Harvard Law Review, vol 71 (1958 ), pp. 630-672, ISSN 0017- 811x.
  • The forms and limits of adjudication. In: Michael Freeman (ed.): alternative dispute resolution. University Press, New York 1995, pp. 3-60, ISBN 0-8147-2636-4.
  • Mediation. Its forms and functions. In: Michael Freeman (ed.): alternative dispute resolution. University Press, New York 1995, pp. 115-150, ISBN 0-8147-2636-4.
  • The Morality of Law. Neuausg. Yale University Press, New Haven 1978, ISBN 0-300-00472-9 (EA 1963).
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