In itself and for us (to himself) terms are the philosophical jargon. With "in itself" is called objects and facts, so far as they are independent of the consciousness of a person. The contrast to this are objects, so far as it " for us ", ie subjectively appear to us in a certain way. Many theorists argued that certain types of objects whose views are "for us" and their nature "in itself" are systematically different. This difference is explained differently. Some philosophers he is in dispute.
Colloquially called " per se " an object such as a fact or as such. The use, however, is usually limiting. So does the statement: " The experience was beautiful in itself" an explanation expect what aspects or conditions in which experience were less beautiful.
The term " per se " is a translation of the Greek or the Latin kath'auto per se and referred to what a being plays by itself in its essence. Already Democritus distinguished the atoms, which alone plays real truth of the sense qualities that arise from opinion. Elaborated systematically is the difference between objects "in itself" and "for us" already in epistemology, ontology and logic of Aristotle:
"The fact that now when that which is as a First and a is known to be a being, the nature of the individual and the individual self and the same thing that is revealed."
Many scholastic thinkers are linked to Aristotle. For example, if the real being is ( esse in re) the being-thought ( esse in intellectu ) compared. Man can the essence of things only with an intuitive knowledge capture ( Duns Scotus and Spinoza later ). In contrast, the ideas formed in the human mind ( the imagination ) are limited.
In Leibniz mediated through the senses ideas are merely " confused ". Only the intellectual knowledge leads to clear ideas. The distinction of " per se " from the phenomena is to be found, inter alia, already with Christian Wolff and Lambert, two thinkers who influenced Immanuel Kant.
Thing-in- itself in Kant
In Kant, the "thing in itself" plays a central role in the Critique of Pure Reason. For him, a being is "in itself", regardless of the forms of intuition, but also of the forms of thought. The thing in itself (also: things in themselves ) as such is not recognized and is the mind objects as phenomena over. Only the symptoms are of human knowledge accessible.
" Idealism consists in the assertion that there is no other as thinking beings, the rest of the things that we believe to perceive in intuition, would only performances in the thinking beings, which correspondirte in fact no outside this befindlicher subject. By contrast, I say: they are given to us as things located outside us objects of our senses, but of what they may be in themselves, we know nothing, but know only their appearances, di the ideas that they work in us by our senses afficiren. Accordingly, I must confess, however, that apart from us giving body, di Things that, although according to what they may be in themselves, entirely unknown to us, we know by the ideas which gives their influence on our sensibility us, and we give the designation of a body; So what word merely means the phenomenon that is unknown to us, but none the less real object. Can we call this idealism that? It is precisely the opposite of that. "
In and of itself in Hegel
In Hegel's philosophy is about the speculative overcoming the subject- object split. Is it the idea of a thing in itself (Kant), of an object independently of us, lack therein is recognizable. The unity of all things is broken.
Have the other hand, people subjectively monopoly on the truth, so a deficiency is evident in it. Again, the unity of all things is broken. This split is a famous central problem of philosophy and identifies the contrast between realism and idealism. In Hegel's dialectic of speculative spirit does away with this division. It is the compilation of opposites:
In an expression " in and of itself " the unity of the world and the mind merges speculative than synthesis.
Class "in itself" and " for itself " in Marx
See class consciousness
The question of Being as a question of meaning
Because the concept of being the most general, it can not be defined on Martin Heidegger. Being everyone goes philosophy ahead yet and can not be captured in language. Because the question of being the " prinzipiellste and most concrete question " is at the same time, you can not ask what is the Being, but must try to understand the being. This led Heidegger to the question of the meaning of Being as the fundamental question of ontology.
" The actual spread of the question of the meaning of 'being' is the intention of the following discussion. "
Nicolai Hartmann criticized here is that the question of the meaning can not be primary, because sense already presupposes its own way of being.
" Sense" is in all circumstances ( in all its meanings ) something for us ' is - more specifically, for us or for something that is our own kind, and if it is only a postulated logical subject. A sense in itself would be an absurdity. So there is still too little, when we say to itself needs being as being no point to have. Rather, it must be said: in itself it can not have meaning. It can only have " for anyone " sense. His sense -have for anyone but - if there is such - is in any case not be 'being'. The Being of beings is indifferent to all that the being could be for someone '. This is the reason why Heidegger's ' world ' to a single human relative ( depending mine ' is ). The sliding of the question of being in the question of meaning makes it different to not. "
Use in Sartre
In Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophical work Being and Nothing are the terms of themselves and for two important categories. That is, human consciousness, human reality or simply man for himself. Sartre borders these terms do not differ from each other and use them synonymously. This in itself, however, is everything that is the transcendent consciousness, the things in the world. The central task of Being and Nothingness, it is now, not a dualism of An and for yourself to fall, but to find a connection between the two.