Overhang seat

Overhang seats can arise in electoral systems that are based on a personalized elected in single constituencies, proportional representation, if in such a voting system a party in the constituencies gains more seats than it would be entitled in accordance with the result of proportional representation.

In the federal election law in Germany that means overhang seats are awarded when a party wins more direct seats by first votes in a state, as it would be entitled in accordance with the second vote results in this State.

Except in the German federal election law overhang mandates are possible for example in New Zealand and Scottish electoral system.

In general, it can not tell which members are holders of surplus seats, but only that at a party a certain number occurred to overhang mandates. Overhang seats can occur more frequently when the balance between direct mandates and party proportional does not take place over the entire electoral area, but in smaller units, either through separate ratio compensation (such as the Bavarian electoral system ) or clearing only after sub-distribution of party seats (as in the federal election law). In many situations, especially the larger parties get overhang seats. But even for small parties overhang seats can occur when they pronounced strongholds (especially in regional parties ) or particularly attractive personalities have, or the electoral system allows tactical choice by vote splitting. In a sense, are those seats overhang seats that are won by individual candidates or direct candidates whose party has failed because of a restrictive clause, as in them not Eligible party votes exist. If those seats are possible, but they are usually treated separately rather than as overhang seats.

• 4.1 Process to 2011 4.1.1 overhang seats in the recent parliamentary elections
• 4.1.2 Mechanisms to achieve many surplus seats

Causes

The personalized elected in single constituencies of proportional representation allocates a certain percentage of the seats ( often half ) for direct mandates and use the remainder of the relationship balance between the parties. When at a party, the imbalance between protein direct mandates and achieved party votes is so great that this residue is not sufficient, there will be overhang mandates. Specifically, the following circumstances promote their occurrence:

• Many small parties, although they together can combine a fairly high share of the vote on, but hardly gain direct mandates. High blocking clauses can reduce the effective number of parties.

• More than two larger parties of similar strength, so that no party can reach a greater number of votes.

• High proportion of direct mandates. If more than half of the seats is determined in the constituencies, can even slightly overhang seats arise in a two-party system.

• Homogeneous voter behavior. The party may then gain almost all direct mandates, without that it requires a particularly large advantage over the other parties. After only voting behavior between the constituencies of concern is, can the homogeneity of the constituency blank control. Effective homogeneous voting behavior may also be present at a regional party, which competes only in their strongholds.

• Low total number of seats. This reduces the likelihood that balance opposing effects in the electoral area. If the balance between direct mandates and party proportional does not take place over the entire electoral area, the amounts attributable to the relevant Sub- areas are crucial seats. On the other hand, allows a small number of seats by the inherent inaccuracy of the seat so that larger allocation method, a somewhat larger deviation before it comes to the first overhang mandate.

• Small number of seats per constituency. More people constituencies are less overhang prone than one constituencies, because they already internally ensure the party proportional to a certain degree.

• Unequal large constituencies, as in smaller constituencies on average fewer votes to mandate profits are needed than in larger ones. The problem is especially true if the smaller constituencies show a uniform voting behavior, for example because it is migration areas or entire regions systematically obtain smaller constituencies (which can easily happen as by sub-distribution of electoral districts within existing subdivisions of electoral district ).

• Uneven voter turnout. Even in constituencies with low voter turnout rich relatively few votes to mandate profit. Frequently it is associated with preferences for certain parties and strengthens their view of overhang seats. If constituencies are tailored according to population rather than the number eligible to vote, a high proportion of non- voters (especially children and foreigners ) is equivalent.

• Pronounced strongholds of smaller parties when. , In some constituencies, for example, particularly locate attractive candidates, the major parties can beat almost, but are otherwise meaningless

• Seat allocation methods that penalize overhang vulnerable parties or prefer not to. Thus reduced as the D' Hondt method, the prospect of larger parties to formal overhang mandates, because it already allocates them more seats than a distortion-free method.

In the case of two votes suffrage, in which voters can choose a party other than that of the selected candidates directly, such vote splitting may favor overhang seats when it is operated in the constituency or electoral area rectified. In addition to statistical coincidences (at low number of voters ), there are the following grounds:

• Voters who voice their persons (first vote ) but not awarded to chance free direct candidates, their party vote ( second vote) to smaller parties. A voting system can support by ballots or alternative voices in the constituencies.
• Parties who have attractive personalities, as a party, however, find less popular.
• Voters who split their vote by a vote splitting between two parties. The same-directedness can be supported by the kind of campaigning by the parties, but also be caused by the very ideas of the voters about the value of both voices.
• Voters who know that they are with their people 's voice can often replace only the direct candidates against an applicant on the relevant party list and assign them accordingly regardless of party affiliation.
• Electoral systems, or only compensate for the overhang mandates insufficient and thereby give the voters the opportunity to increase his voting power by deliberately provoked overhang mandates through tactical choice.
• Parties who set up no or few direct candidates and so force their voters to a vote splitting. Where it is not in derogation of the right to vote, they can direct their candidates instead as "independents " or line up by a Tarnpartei.

Dealing with surplus seats

Since overhang mandates from the combination of personal election by majority vote in each constituency and party choice according to the principle of proportional result at a higher level, they could be completely avoided by waiver of these two components. Also could made ​​the presence of overhang mandates significantly less likely by a significant increase in the constituencies, thus reducing the number of direct mandates, also this is not impossible. However, the objection is raised against such a significant increase sometimes that this should perish, the binding of the citizen to the deputies. Due to the advantages of personal election and proportional representation, therefore, in different countries (eg, Germany ) taken overhang seats in the provisional allocation of votes in buying and then further treated with one of the following regulations:

Internal overhang seats

Complex itself represents the situation when the electoral area is divided and the parties are entitled to seats are distributed in a second step, each of the individual sub- areas. Then, in each of these sub-distributions can overhang seats arise that it has not yet given at the upper distribution to the parties. This is known as internal as opposed to external overhang mandates.

In principle, thereby re-open the options described above, but now the sub-areas are what the parties were before. Where has been enlarged Parliament before, now the party gets additional seats, which also the party proportional representation is distorted. Where the party's proportional representation was previously impaired, it is now the regional proportional representation (initially within the parties and as a result tend to be in the overall view, where the ideal ratio can be but already significantly disturbed by the added inaccuracy of the distributions anyway ). Where the regional proportional representation with respect to the representation of the constituencies and the party proportional is considered to be clearly subordinated, but should not be dispensed on regional lists, and thus sub-distributions, lends itself to the sub-distributions in particular the solution " seats not overhanging regions adopt a '. This is called internal compensation.

Example

A parliament have a target number of 100 seats of which 60 seats in the constituencies assigned (first vote ), the remaining 40 are the ratio compensation on party lists ( second vote). The election result was as follows:

Party A are therefore the one hand, only 50 seats on the other hand, it has only in the constituencies already entitled to 60 seats. So there is a surplus of 10 seats.

The five basic ways in which the seats in this contradictory result can actually be distributed now, are as follows:

The different ways therefore lead to very wide fluctuations in the seat share of each party.

Overhang seats in the federal election law

The German Bundestag is made up of those candidates who are selected with the first votes as direct candidates ( according to the principle of majority voting ), as well as those candidates that feed as a list candidate into Parliament, together. Essentially, the number of seats allotted to each party is determined ( proportional representation ) by the second votes. Initially, half of the total of 598 available seats of the 299 constituency winners will be occupied ( the winners of the direct mandates ). Other courses that may be entitled in accordance with their second vote share of each party, are normally filled with candidates from the country lists that have been established before the election of the national associations of the parties. Thus, in general, reduces each won a direct mandate of a party, the number of their remaining list mandates.

Process until 2011

In federal elections until 2009 the total number of seats that a party tion states in a federal state, was initially determined solely by the second votes. Had a party within a country more direct mandates, than would be granted after the second vote mandates of the country quota, emerged overhang seats. The party was allowed to keep the additional seats, the tion states her through the overhang seats, even though they allow more deputies despatched when her tion states by the second votes. Through this overhang mandates, the number of MPs increased in the Bundestag. A balance in favor of other parties, which would adjust the second votes ratio again, the respective number of seats, took place in federal elections until 2009, not instead of, but probably in some state elections.

Arbitration equipped with a direct mandate deputy who had moved from a state with surplus seats in the Bundestag, while out of the legislature, pushed for him no candidate from the country list or from the constituency after ( substitutes judgment).

Overhang seats in the previous parliament elections

Overhang seats occurred already at the first federal election, up to and including 1990, she played only a minor role. 1994 occurred overhang seats for the first time to a large extent on: twelve for the CDU and four for the SPD. The Union was able to stabilize their narrow lead. This caused a series of reflections on the constitutionality of the regulation. However, the Federal Constitutional Court stated ( at 4:4 equality of votes in the Second Senate ) on 10 April 1997 as part of a 1995 by the SPD -governed state of Lower Saxony case brought judicial review proceedings, the proporzverzerrende effect of overhang seats compatible with the Basic Law.

In the Bundestag elections of 1998 and 2005, the SPD received more each overhang seats as the CDU / CSU. So she came in 2002, despite a projection of only 6,027 votes of second votes ( equivalent to 0.01 %) by overhang seats to three seats more than the Union and thus remained the strongest party. In 2005, the Union received despite a projection of 436 384 votes (equivalent to 0.9%), only four seats more than the SPD.

For the majority coalition in the 17th German Bundestag, who was elected on 27 September 2009, the overhang seats were irrelevant because the opposition parties and the FDP would have had a majority with 308 of 598 seats without these mandates. However, the overhang mandates led to the following curious situation: SPD, Greens and FDP had 48.3 % of the vote, the CDU / CSU and left together had 45.7 % of the vote. However, the CDU / CSU and the left had in common 315 seats, while the SPD, Greens and FDP were only 307 seats; 2.6% fewer votes, 8 mandates more.

In the elections of 1965, 1969, 1972 and 1976, there was no overhang mandates.

Mechanisms to achieve many surplus seats

The two mechanisms for increasing the number of overhang seats were:

• Victory in many constituencies
• Comparatively few party votes

The regulation of overhang seats allowed voters who wanted to support an alliance scope for strategic voting. A voter who, for example, preferred a red-green coalition had its first vote rationally the SPD should provide in order to facilitate the entry of direct candidate of the SPD in the Bundestag, are consistent with the second vote but for the list of the Greens and so on overhang mandates for the SPD to speculate. This ticket splitting could theoretically ( if it had been applied by many devotees namely a coalition ) have significant effects on the composition of the Bundestag. In the discussion of the third electoral law of 1956, the SPD expressed fears that this option, which offered the specific form of the German personalized proportional representation, could be used by supporters of a massive black-yellow coalition.

In theory, the control of the overhang mandates, therefore, was an undesirable feature of the German electoral system, so that always was discussed to compensate for the possibility of the imposition of countervailing mandates. Historically, however, overhang seats are hardly been of importance (see above), since such a strategically motivated ticket splitting was never performed to a significant extent, be it on the basis of clear party preferences or simply due to ignorance.

Reform because of unconstitutionality

Constitutionally problematic appeared in particular the fact that the distribution of seats among the regional lists was a negative voting weight occur during the federal election system by an interaction of overhang mandates. In these situations, there was a reversal of the dependence of the distribution of seats on the ballot: either additional votes for a party could cost them a seat or fewer votes this party gain an additional seat. Voter votes would then be acting against the will of the voters. In fact, there were several concrete examples in which negative voting weight altered the distribution of seats in the Bundestag. For the voter was in the normal case (except the by-election in the constituency of Dresden in 2005 I was ) not clear whether its vote favorably or unfavorably impacted for the selected party, as this depended on a random for him a priori constellation.

In order to clarify whether such random majority contraptions are constitutionally in a personalized proportional representation, multiple choice exam complaints were raised to the national elections in 1998, 2002 and 2005, the Federal Constitutional Court. The court announced on 3 July 2008 in two methods for testing the 2005 federal election, that the former practice of awarding of overhang seats is unconstitutional because of the phenomenon of negative voting weight. The legislature a deadline to June 2011 was granted so that the 2009 federal election once again the old system could remain valid. In February 2009 - seven months before the 2009 federal election - of the Alliance 90/The Greens has introduced a bill to amend the Federal Election Law in Federal Parliament, which met the requirements of the Federal Constitutional Court, in its opinion. On July 3, 2009, he was rejected by a vote of Union, SPD and FDP.

A 2011 adopted by the CDU and FDP against the votes of the opposition revision of the Federal Electoral Act to remedy the dunned by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2007 defects was explained by this July 25, 2012 again unconstitutional. Then agreed in October 2012, the government parties and the SPD and the Greens on the imposition of countervailing mandates. The reform was adopted on 21 February 2013, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat on 1 March 2013 and by the adjustment of 6Vorlage §: § / Maintenance / buzer, 46Vorlage §: § / Maintenance / buzer, 48Vorlage §: § / Maintenance / buzer and § 51Vorlage: § / maintenance / buzer the Federal Electoral Act implemented.

The new scheme will provide a caused by compensatory seats complete compensation in cases where the number of seats reached by direct candidates of a party in a state exceeds the entitled her there alone because of the second votes Distribution seat number. For other reasons, resulting (for example, due to rounding errors, different choice of investments in the various federal states ) deviations from the second vote distribution ( a so-called distortion overhang) are compensated by compensatory seats. During the term of retiring Members of a Party are now being replaced in each case by the most top candidate substitutes on the relevant country list.

Due to the compensatory seats however, can lead to a significant increase in the Bundestag over the previous minimum of 598 members out. For example, would result with the election results of 2009, according to a new election law 648 seats, while it was under the old 622. A large increase occurs in particular when a nationwide relatively small party (such as the CSU ) in a state wins all though direct mandates, but there remains with their second vote share well below 50 %. Experts consider for the future size of the Bundestag of up to 800 deputies for not unrealistic.