Philosophical Investigations

The Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein are late, second major work. The book lays down the basic ideas of the philosophy of ordinary language. The Philosophical Investigations exercised an extraordinary influence on the philosophy of the second half of the 20th century; among others, the speech act with John Langshaw Austin and John Rogers Searle and the Erlanger constructivism (Paul Lorenzen, Kuno Lorenz ) build on the ideas presented here on. The book is directed against the philosophy of the ideal language that had next to Bertrand Russell and Rudolf Carnap especially Wittgenstein himself still, represented in his first major work, the Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus.

The book is written in the years 1936-1946, but was only in 1953, after the death of the author, published. In contrast to the strictly systematic structure of the Tractatus, the Philosophical Investigations are a more or less loose collection of aphorisms and notes. After Wittgenstein's statement, he has tried several times to " weld together into such a whole " his results until he had to admit that he " would never succeed in doing so " ( preface). Nonetheless, yet can be quite a number of theses on various subjects identify complexes, which will be presented briefly below.

The use theory of meaning

Wittgenstein is directed against the so-called "realistic" theory of meaning, is considered by the. "Every word has a meaning. [ ... ] It is the object for which the word stands. " (PU 1). According to this theory, the meaning of the word as an abstract object, the color red for Wittgenstein would be " red ", however, the meaning of a word in most cases is determined by its use: " One can go for a large class of cases, the use of the word "meaning" - though not for all cases its use - explain this word as follows: the meaning of a word is its use in the language " (PU 43).

The use of a word is determined by rules similar to the correct usage of a chess piece: " The question, What is a word ' is analogous to ' What is a pawn? ' " (PU 108). "Red" to know the meaning of the word, means to have a rule that you can distinguish red from non- red things. A merchant from which you requested red apples, for example, could keep the apples next to a color sample to determine whether they are red (PU 1). The close relationship that Wittgenstein between the meaning of a word and the rules for its use looks, also comes in the following quote expresses: " How do I know that this color is red. One answer would be, I learned German. ' " (PU 381 ).

Language game and form of life

The rules of use of a word are determined by the fact that linguistic utterances in daily interactions play a specific function. " Look at the clue to its meaning as a tool and as its use. " (PU 421). However, this function may be different in different situations. For the occurrence of language in specific contexts Wittgenstein uses the word " language game ": Wittgenstein are a number of examples of language games " commands and for commands act - Describe an object after watching - preparing an article for a description - reports of a course of events [ ... ] - Ask, Thank, cursing, Greeting, Pray " (PU 23).

For the entirety of the action patterns in a culture Wittgenstein uses the word " life ". The individual language games are ultimately always embedded in a way of life: "The word ' language game ' to emphasize here that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life " (PU 23). In this sense, Wittgenstein can say, " And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life " (PU 19).

Follow a rule

The rules of use of a word can be according to Wittgenstein by forward and imitation convey: " I'll do it to him, he makes it after me; and I influence him by expressions of approval, rejection [ ... ], etc. Think you were a witness of such teaching. It would be explained in a word by itself, made ​​no logical circle. " (PU 208). However, Wittgenstein encounters the following difficulty: A rule is always learned only at a finite number of examples, but it should ultimately be applicable to an infinite number of cases. It follows that the rule that to be learned patterns of action does not set, there is always a variety of patterns that are compatible with it: "Our paradox was this: a rule could not determine a course of action, as each action with the rule in accordance to bring is " (PU 201).

Wittgenstein's solution to this problem is the following: The fact that there are a lot of ways to continue the rule, does not mean that we consciously decide for one of these possibilities. She urges us to rather directly: "If I follow the rule, I do not choose. I follow the rule blindly. " (PU 219). A theoretically possible doubt has virtually no place in this situation. "It may doubt was possible. But that does not say that I doubted or could even doubt " (PU 213).

The therapeutic function of philosophy

This passage exemplifies a figure of argumentation, which is typical for the Philosophical Investigations: Wittgenstein After many philosophical problems result from the fact that terms their original context, its language game, be alienated, and are applied unfairly to another context. The solution of a philosophical problem is often to uncover such unjustified transfer: " We carry the words from their metaphysical back to their everyday use " (PU 116).

For example, the doubt is a language game, which follows its own rules and conditions, and not in every situation has its place. By this reasoning is a philosophical doubt as to the skepticism which doubts everything, exposed as nonsense. "But that does not say that we doubt because we can imagine a doubt " (PU 84).

With a similar argument Wittgenstein criticizes the fundamental question of the logical atomism according to the basic components of the world: " On the philosophical question: the facial image of this tree is composed and what are its components ' is the right answer, That depends on what you are taking, composed ' understand ' (and this is of course no answer, but a rejection of the question. ) "( PU 47). The question of the composition is a language game that can not be transferred to such abstract context.

Similarly, Wittgenstein solves the induction problem, in which the practice of learning from experience is called into question: " The certainty that fire will burn me, is based on induction. [ ... ] Is the optimism justified? What can people apply as justification shows how they think and live " (PU 325). Ultimately, based on the conviction that we can learn from experience in our world. A stronger justification can not deliver and also does not require philosophy. In this sense, Wittgenstein says: " Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we should see the facts as, primordial phenomena '. That where should we say: this language game is played " (PU 654 ).

Private Language

A private language, according to Wittgenstein a language or language game, in which, in principle, only the speaker can even know the meaning of the words of that language. The case of Robinson Crusoe does not count as a private language, because this is in principle capable of the meaning of its language elements to others. Wittgenstein's example is a sensation language: " The words of this language are to refer to that which can only know the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. " (PU 243). In the private language argument, he shows that the use of words of a private language is meaningless. By Wittgenstein turns against the possibility of such language (PU 258), he turns at the same time against the thesis that in our own language terms for Mental, such as the word "pain " to take on such private episodes reference. According to Wittgenstein's theory of meaning we learn such words in intersubjective language games. However, a purely private experience can not convey intersubjective, but rather dealing with it. This thesis comes in the famous beetle - parable to the expression: " Suppose it had each a box, it would be something that we call, beetles '. Nobody can ever look in the box of the other, and everyone says he knows only by the sight of his beetle, which is a beetle. [ ... ] The thing in the box does not belong to the language game, not even as a something, because the box could be empty " (PU 293).

Talk about mental processes must be analyzed as talk about external behavior: " An internal process requires external criteria " (PU 580).

Family resemblance

Core point of Wittgenstein's critique of the philosophy of the ideal language is that it represents its demand for accuracy, the blur of natural language terms as a shortcoming. For this blurring Wittgenstein coined the term " family resemblances ". He explained in PU 66 on the example of the word "game". There are no common train according to Wittgenstein, who would all play together. There is another aspect of vagueness is that our concepts do not work reliably in all, but only in ordinary situations: " Only in normal cases, the use of the words is clearly marked out to us; we know, have no doubt about what we have to say in this or that case " (PU 142, PU see also 80).

However, this inaccuracy makes our concepts by no means useless "But it is needless to say, ' Keep it about here ' " (PU 71). On the contrary, would be just an exaggerated precision inappropriate: " If I tell someone, 'You should punctual to eat come [ ... ] ' is here of accuracy really no question, because you can say, Think of the time determination in the laboratory [ ... ] because you see what, accuracy 'means' " (PU 88). However, is exactly what disregards the philosophy of the ideal language: " The more closely we look at the actual language, the stronger the conflict between her and our claim " (PU 107). From these observations, Wittgenstein concludes: "The philosophy may not touch the actual use of the language in any way it can in the end only describe so " (PU 124).

Quotes

• "Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses. " (PU 18)
• " And in this situation is such as to the one who seeks in aesthetics or ethics for definitions that meet our terms. Ask yourself always in this difficulty: how do we have the meaning of this word ( 'good', for example ) learned " (PU 77)
• " Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. " (PU 109)
• "It is a major source of our failure to understand that we do not overlook the use of our words " (PU 122)
• " The most important aspects of things for us are hidden because of their simplicity and ordinariness " (PU 129)

• "One rule to follow, make an announcement, give a command to play a game of chess are customs ( customs, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to learn a technique. " (PU 199)
• " The philosopher treats a question; like a disease. " (PU 255)
• "What is your aim in philosophy? Show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. " (PU 309)