Solipsism

The term solipsism (Latin solus " alone " and ipse " self " ) is used in philosophy, in various ways, including for theses following type:

• Metaphysical solipsism: Only the ego exists. Nothing outside of his own consciousness exists, no other consciousness.
• Methodological solipsism: The importance conceived notions depends solely on states of consciousness of the thinking subject.
• Ethical solipsism or " egoism ": It is rational to assess and align their own actions only after that their own preferences are met (about own physical well-being, etc.) as much as possible ( and preferences of other drawing into account at all).

All three types of solipsism were and are being developed in different forms, defended and attacked by other philosophers.

Conceptual history

In the 19th century, the term " solipsism " approximately equal synonymous with " selfishness ". What is nowadays usually called " metaphysical solipsism " (nothing except his own consciousness exists ) is, for the most part " (logical ) egoism " called. Such a position is described by Johann Burkhard Menckestraße: The " Egoistas " would represent:

" Quod sint solo in mundo, cetera omnia tantum in ipsorum cogitationibus existant ( they are the only ones in the world, any other would only exist in one's own thoughts ) "

Menckes report is based on a Jesuit polemic, which is directed against the positions of Descartes, George Berkeley and its students.

History of Ideas

According to the Cartesianism, there are only two types of entities: consciousness (res cogitans ) and material objects (res extensa ). Only the existence of one's own thinking Self is epistemologically certain. In addition, given we are only consciousness levels. Descartes said: " The outside world could be a mere dream. "

According to Arthur Schopenhauer, the whole of reality is subject to a principle, which he calls "the will ". "The world is my idea " Schopenhauer is considered the first major set of his philosophy. The world, viewed as a representation, divided into subjects and objects, which differ from each other, but in the end both are indeed inseparable only manifestations of the metaphysical will. The people as the supreme manifestation of noumenal metaphysical will is given, according to Schopenhauer, the possibility of lifting the illusion of personal will and thus reach a state of non-being, nirvana. This shows a strong influence of Indian philosophy, in Schopenhauer's translation of a body part of an early transfer of the Upanishads: "The whole world I 'm basically alone and besides me there is nothing else existent and the whole of creation I made myself ." Schopenhauer himself, however, sets itself apart from the solipsism.

Max Stirner formulated in The Ego and Its Own (1845 ) theses such as "I'm nothing like me " or "I 'm not an ego along with other egos, but the sole Me: I 'm only " He therefore opposes a foundation of ethics from general concepts such as that of mankind. The orientation am I in his " uniqueness " he suggests as an overcoming of determinateness by external forces ( Stirner speaks of " realism" ) or abstract ideas ( " idealism " ), in short, any desire to be something other than one's own self; he criticizes modern alternative positions as not leading because religious justification pattern - what is true, for example, for Ludwig Feuerbach's orientation to the species being human. Between I and society or state any obligations should exist, but rather an antagonism. This position of the "peculiarity " independent of any obligation he meditates on other people as well. You can join together in their own interest - but not as a means to one of their "peculiarity " and thus contiguous different purpose.

Jean -Paul Sartre sees the " cliff of solipsism " a continuing problem.

In phenomenology also debates on the problem of social perception have to do with the issue of solipsism.

In Ludwig Wittgenstein the theme of the metaphysical or epistemological solipsism is treated indirectly in connection with the private language argument. According to this there can not be a purely private language or just the speaker known meanings of its utterances. The logical structure of Wittgenstein's argument is as well as its validity and plausibility of many proposed reconstructions and modifications until now moot. A simplified example is reading: Only if other participants accept the use of the same language utterances in that language according to shared use conventions or reject these statements can be true at all.

Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor and others have the terms " methodological solipsism " and " externalism " embossed ( with respect to the contents of utterances or conceived notions ). According to the latter, the meaning of words or terms depends on the real existence of their speakers in the ( mind- independent ) world. The thought experiment is intended to illustrate the twin earth; it results in the claim: what our water term means ultimately depends for example on how the element with which we interacted in fact causal, is really designed - not, for example, as it seems to be phenomenal. If this position is plausible, the assent to a methodological as well as a metaphysical solipsism, the usual view, implausible.