Soviet submarine K-278 Komsomolets

K -278

Immersed: 8,500

• 6 torpedo tubes 533 mm

Ammunition:

• Torpedoes
• RPK -2 "Starfish "

Surface search radar " Snoop Head " active low frequency sonar "Shark Gill " System for Electronic Warfare " Bald Eagle "

The K -278 Komsomolets was a Soviet nuclear submarine. It entered service in 1984. The boat sank on April 7, 1989.

Project 685 Plawnik

In the submarine class designated by NATO as Mike is nuclear-powered experimental submarines for the Soviet Navy. The boat K -278 Komsomolets was the only boat of this class.

In the as Plawnik (Russian Плавник for Finn ) designated project, there was a progressive submarine design that was created for testing new technologies in life. The boat should carry a varying armament of torpedoes and cruise missiles. The missiles could be equipped with both conventional and nuclear warheads. Development work began even in the 1960s. The keel laying of the first boat took place on 22 April 1978.

Komsomolets

This boat was named Komsomolets (Russian Комсомолец for a member of the Komsomol ). The boat carrying the hull number K -278 was lowered into the water on May 9, 1983, provided the end of 1984 in service. The boat was a prototype and should remain the only one of its class. A second unit was indeed placed in Severodvinsk on keel, but canceled before completion.

The boat was built to the usual requirements of the Soviet Navy. It was a double-hulled boat with the following seven watertight compartments (front to aft ):

• Torpedo room
• Accommodation of the crew
• Headquarters
• Reactor space
• Electric motors
• Turbines
• Department auxiliary machinery

The inner pressure hull was made ​​of lightweight and highly resistant titanium, which gave the boat the greatest depth of all then existing submarines. The boat could operate at a depth of 1000 m. This depth could not be reached by the best available at the time the U.S. submarine. At the same time the boat could be located through the use of titanium is very difficult to MAD sensors. The Mike class had a built- in tower construction rescue capsule, which should bear the crew in an emergency to the surface. There was uncertainty about the type of reactor. Western intelligence suspected two liquid- metal -cooled (lead -bismuth mixture ) reactors ( in principle similar to the Alfa class) on board. The Soviet Union denied this, however, immediately and stated that the boat would driven by a single pressurized water reactor of conventional design. A direct consequence of this was the considerable reduction in the estimated speed of the boat. If one went from the beginning of up to 38 knots in the submerged state, you corrected it down to less than 30 knots.

A disadvantage of the direct liquid metal cooled reactors may be used in very specific, the need to maintain the reactor pressure vessel constantly operating temperature. Without constant supply of heat to solidify the liquid metal, and the reactor can not be approached. To completely shut down the reactor (0 % power), an external supply of hot steam must be ensured in order to keep the metal in the liquid state.

The fate of the Komsomolets

On April 7, 1989 broke out in the rear cargo area from the Komsomolets fire. The boat was located at a depth 150-380 meters, as a valve of a high pressure air line, which connected the main ballast tanks of the boat, burst and leaking oil (probably from the hydraulic valve ) began on a hot surface fire. However, the spread of the fire could not be stopped by closing up departments, and the fire spread through the cable ducts of the boat. As a direct result, the automatic emergency shut-down of the reactor was taken to prevent overloading. This meant that the drive failed. The lack of energy caused the system failure throughout the boat, including the failure of most security systems. The Boat succeeded after eleven minutes to reach the surface, but the crack in the compressed air system stoked the fire further. Much of the crew left the boat. After several hours, the shell broke, and the boat sank. The commander and four other remaining crew members on board were trying to save themselves with the emergency capsule. This, however, was partially flooded and filled with toxic gases - only one of them survived the ascent to the surface. Although the crew had radioed for help, and the emergency exit from the boat were already on site rescue aircraft to drop liferafts, however, were not enough for the 50 men present. 42 Of the 69 crew members died during and after the disaster, most of them by hypothermia in cold water because they had not managed to put on their life suits before the emergency exit.

The boat is located 180 km south-east of Bear Island in the Norwegian Sea off the coast of Norway at a depth of about 1858 meters on position 73 ° 43 ' 17 "N, 13 ° 15' 51" O73.72138888888913.264166666667Koordinaten: 73 ° 43 ' 17 "N, 13 ° 15 ' 51 " O.

At the time of the sinking of the boat carrying two nuclear -tipped torpedoes and eight conventional torpedoes. There were initiated two investigations. A government of the USSR, the other later by an independent body. Both could not fully explain the exact circumstances that led to the loss of the boat, but the second study looked at the course of events in deficiencies in design of the boat due. Likewise, the poor level of training of the crew was criticized. Norway later explained that one two hours before the sinking by air or sea could reach the boat, but you had been notified too late.

The consequences of the sinking of the Komsomolets

The sinking site is in one of the richest fishing areas in the world, and an escape of radioactive material could bring billions in losses to the fishing industry. In May 1992, the research vessel " Akademik Mstislav Keldysh " was summoned to the scene and discovered numerous fractures along the entire length of the pressure shell of titanium. Some were up to 40 cm long. Also believed to detect cracks in the primary cooling circuit. Cracks in this cycle would allow radioactive material to leave the reactor core and into the seawater and thus enter the food chain. In spring 1993, the Russian government classified the fractures as a safe. Another study in August 1993 examined the circulation movement of the water at the accident scene, but did not provide " vertical mixing " of the layers fixed and thus no acute risk of radioactive contamination. Surprised it was, however, a nearly 8 m big hole in Bugtorpedoraum that could not be explained by the circumstances of the accident, but obviously stemmed from an explosion.

For dives with small submarines, it was found that the sea water has started to decompose the coats of the warheads of torpedoes and the hull of the boat. This process is further accelerated by the rapidly changing currents of water in the area. If under these circumstances leak radioactive material, the rapid spread would be unavoidable. As in a study the leakage of plutonium 239 was detected from any of the warheads in the summer of 1994, sealed to the torpedo bay.

The cost of the salvage of the boat in 1995 were estimated at over one billion U.S. dollars. In addition, she hid the risk that the shell could break in the project. As a fallback plan, the sealing of the boat with a jelly-like material was envisaged. The implementation of this plan began on 24 June 1995 and was completed in July 1996. It is assumed that the case provides 20 to 30 years of protection. Investigations end of the 1990s showed only a small outlet radioactive material.

Criticism

Many details of the sinking remain unclear, but one goes from faulty designs. So it is understandable that it is not the crew managed to empty the compressed air system to remove the sources of fire oxygen. The failure of the safety systems, the spread of fires through the Kabelkänale and the failure of the main reactor are further inconsistencies.

In addition, the shell has the Komsomolets proved to be resistant to corrosion. The flooding of the rescue capsule with water, filling them with toxic gases, the failure of the fire-extinguishing systems, the inflammation of the oil on hot surface and the failure of the crew to fight the fire point to a faulty design.