AVR reactor

F1

Decommissioned Reactors ( gross ):

The nuclear power plant AVR Jülich ( Jülich Working Group Experimental Reactor ), an experimental nuclear power plant was the first German high-temperature reactor (HTR ). So this was not a research reactor, but the system was used to generate electricity. As a ' spiritual father ' of the plant, although Rudolf Schulten is often referred to, but the AVR is closely based on the concept of Daniels pile after Farrington Daniels, the inventor of pebble bed reactors at. The conditions for the construction of the AVR were significantly created by the NRW Research politicians Leo Brandt.

The AVR had a net electrical output of 13 MW and was operated from 1966-88, with several mishaps and accidents occurred. The plant is located in Jülich immediately adjacent to the site of the Forschungszentrum Jülich (FZJ ) in an area made ​​available as a long lease from the state of NRW. The AVR - deconstruction proves to be exceptionally difficult.

History

The AVR was built in 1961 by the BBC and Krupp. The AVR- planning and the construction carried on almost purely industrial base, to 1964, led by Rudolf Schulten. However, there was financial support from the federal government. It was only after 1964 began FZJ after Schulten had become head of the institute there to devote more attention to the pebble bed reactor. 1966, the AVR was first critically, in 1967 fed the power plant for the first time electricity into the public grid. Owner and operator was a consortium of local electricity suppliers under the leadership of Stadtwerke Dusseldorf, who had founded in 1957 to the AVR GmbH. Information on construction costs fluctuate 85-125 million DM AVR GmbH was until 2003 formally an independent company, but de facto dependent from around 1970 by FZJ: FZJ paid high operating grants to the AVR GmbH to ensure the continued operation since the current generated in the AVR only covered a small portion of operating costs. Mid-1970s were about DM 3 million current revenue / year operating costs without the Fuel and disposal of DM / year 11 million over. To support the AVR by FZJ the procurement and the withdrawal of the fuel spheres was: FZJ was and is the owner of AVR fuel elements. In contracts between AVR GmbH and FZJ details of the AVR- operation have been established. In addition, the AVR mode was scientifically monitored by FZJ.

In the first years of the AVR with cooling gas outlet temperatures of 650 ° C to 850 ° C, was nominally operated from February 1974 until the end of 1987 to 950 ° C. The latter high temperatures are referred to in Jülich as a world record for nuclear plants, but were far surpassed in the U.S. test reactor UHTREX. You should demonstrate the AVR suitability for coal gasification and thus contribute to a longer -term perspective for the coal production in NRW. The planned electrical efficiency of 38 % could not be reached (gross 32 % real efficiency, net 29%), presumably due to Gasbypässen to the steam generator, despite the progress of high gas temperatures. After the discovery of AVR core areas with excessively high temperatures were in the last year of operation, however, 810 ° C are not exceeded, so that the suitability of coal gasification must be called into question. The proposed conversion of the AVR in a coal gasification plant has not been granted, nor the construction of an advanced AVR -II in Jülich. After 21 years of operation, the reactor was shut down on 31 December 1988. Altogether he produced about 1.7 billion kilowatt-hours (gross ) of electricity and fed a 1.5 billion kilowatt hours of electricity into the public grid. A review of experimental operation of the AVR from the perspective of the proponents of this technology laid the Association of German Engineers VDI 1990 before. According to critics corresponds to the state of the AVR to the operating end of a Damaged reactor - the only reactor in Germany. The strontium contamination in the reactor vessel is then comparable to that of the TMI reactor after its meltdown.

The decommissioning concept was changed in the following years of " safe enclosure " about " gutting " in " complete elimination ". For this, the AVR in 2003 was integrated into the state-owned energy company deconstruction Nord ECN, which specializes in dismantling difficult problems. This followed the opinion of the Federal Court was one that exercised massive criticism of the lack of progress of the AVR - disposal project 1989-2002 under Jülich line and recommended that other project managers as FZJ and AVR. The EWN CEO saw with the AVR - demolition of a hitherto difficult tasks on his company forward. Currently, preparations are underway for the complete elimination of the plant. In 2006, a 60 × 40 -foot lock material made ​​of steel was erected in front of the reactor building to allow the ejection of the reactor vessel. According schedules from 2009 should be 2015 completed the demolition work and be made the state a "green field " while the reactor container is stored 200 meters for at least 60 years. Currently (2014 ) is only 2022 expected completion of the renovation of the AVR- site. Because of the high contamination of the cooling circuit of the dismantling preparing namely considerable problems. In 2000, the operator admitted that the β - contamination ( 90Sr ) of the AVR reactor even the highest of all reactors and nuclear facilities worldwide and is also still in the worst form, namely dust- bound. Also exceptionally high and hindrance in the disposal is the amount of long-lived 14C, which contaminated by extensive use, but cheap coal stone instead of graphite and by a careless use of nitrogen in the reactor was operating (see here).

Construction

Notwithstanding the normally used arrangement of the steam generator, the steam generator when AVR was located above the reactor core next to the reactor core, which has a particularly small space consumption. The shutdown rods are inserted into separate graphite columns that penetrate the reactor core from the bottom of the reactor. Also on the bottom of the reactor are the cooling fan, and the ball -pulling device. Derived from the vertical arrangement and the small area consumption, there was at BBC / HRB plans for a HTR - 100 industrial power plant, which should be directly used in industrial plants for process heat and power generation. In operation of the AVR, however, showed the need to prevent constructive definitely that water can penetrate into the reactor core and a vertical arrangement is therefore risky. During the construction of the commercial prototype THTR -300 at Hamm- Uentrop the steam generators were therefore placed next to the core and the core rods without graphite columns driven directly from the top of the pebble bed, which allows a more compact core structure. However, this directly driving into the pebble bed core rods proved to be a bad design because too many fuel elements were destroyed, and so newer concepts build this regard again to the AVR. Although the arrangement of steam generators in separate containers next to the core container reduces the probability of penetration of liquid water into the core, but increases the risk of ingress of air with graphite fire because of the connection line between the tanks as a weak point. Therefore, the integrated tank concept of the AVR was not completely abandoned, but lives in a number of project proposals further.

The AVR reactor tank is about the same size as that of the nuclear power plant crumbs, the electrical power was but 100 times larger.

Incidents

On July 1, 1973 " Increased disposal of radioactive tritium into the atmosphere " was registered as a reportable event at the Federal Office for Radiation Protection. From 1967 to 1973 worked namely the tritium filter in the exhaust air stream does not, and the tritium entered the environment. Actual numbers were not disclosed. The tritium production in the AVR was due to lithium impurities in some components (coal stone) but unusually high, so it could have come to significant emissions. An extensive turbine oil fire occurred on February 11, 1971, after a leak was sealed only temporarily in an oil line. As a probable consequence of an air intrusion (100 m³) on 10 May 1971, it was the mid-1970s to fuel element damage (so-called Pellkartoffeleffekt ). On September 7, 1971 reached 50 l corrosive hydrochloric acid in the feed water of the secondary circuit. In 1974 it was discovered that due to lack of radiation shielding to the top - a serious error of interpretation by the BBC - significant radiation exposure by Skyshine (in air reflected gamma rays and neutrons ) to about 100 m outside the fence occurred (see Bioschild 1 in the illustration composition of the AVR reactor that is missing in the upper spherical dome ). Within the grounds were total dose rates of more than 10 mSv / y, measured at the fence to 4 mSv / y. On the roof of the reactor, the dose rates were even up to 2 mSv / h = 17 Sv / y. After the supervisor had threatened to mid-1975 reactor decommissioning, temporary shielding measures have been taken, with which the neutron radiation could be reduced by up to a factor of 2. Due to the residual stress, however, part of the forest outside the AVR- site to the public had to be closed. In the first half of 1976, the release of cesium and strontium got out of the fuel in the cooling circuit by more than 3 orders of magnitude at. A satisfactory explanation for this are not yet available. On the part of a critical observer of concealed hitherto fault is suspected, in which the reactor was due to high concentrations of fissile material in the outer core region is not sufficiently under control, leading to very high temperatures led. On 31 October 1980, a Abschaltstab stuck at a trial the reactor scram. 1982 poured 120 liters of oil from the helium gas circulators in the main cooling circuit, where large amounts of soot and deposits were formed by the decomposition of the oil. Through a leaky drain valve of the containment vessel arrived on June 11, 1987 radioactivity into the environment.

By 1982, the Abbrandmessanlage worked in the reactor, with which the rest of fissile material content of the removed balls should be determined, in fact, not after only unsatisfactory. Therefore, could the fissile material distribution in the reactor, which should be influenced by a specific recirculation of balls suitable burn- in edge or indoors, are poorly controlled. In addition, in 1984 showed that the reactor core was unsymmetrically loaded in the ball feed device due to a design error, which had an unbalanced load result. Both are likely to have led to significant deviations from intended operating parameters. Since globular clusters reactors can not be equipped with continuously operating measuring devices in the core, there are no exact data can be given. The errors of the Abbrandmessung also mean that the contents of each Castor with AVR spent fuel elements are only imprecisely known.

From 13 to May 22, 1978 occurred due to a leak in the superheater section of the steam generator 27,5 t of water in the He- primary circuit and thus into the reactor core one. Although this incident only to the then lowest category C was filed ( only minor safety significance or no ), there are (possibility of prompt Überkritikalität of the reactor ) and the possible chemical reaction of water with the graphite with education because of the positive Reaktivitätseffekts of water explosive gases one of the most dangerous incidents for a high temperature reactor dar. the incident was probably the only reason why no serious consequences because only the core temperatures below 500 ° C and contained because the leak was small. Nevertheless, the reactor had almost a year to be " dried " to remove contaminated with fission products remaining water by driving at a reduced temperature. Under the reactor is since then through the fault of radioactively contaminated soil and groundwater. Was a result of the incident that is the foundation of the aqueous humor, which is in direct contact with the environment, contaminated significantly with radioactive 90Sr and tritium. While strontium is still present in the region of the reactor, tritium has probably removed quickly with the ground water, which no longer is but understandable. The activity of tritium in case of failure of water was a factor of 70 to 300 higher than that of strontium. These groundwater contamination by tritium in the AVR is likely in the opinion of Rainer Moormann, former employee of the FZJ, be the largest so far been radioactive groundwater contamination by a civilian nuclear facility in Western Europe. As a result of this fault are arrangements have been made in subsequent designs of high-temperature reactors, which are designed to prevent flooding of the core with liquid secondary refrigerant. These arrangements but increase the risk of leakage at the Primärkreisumschliessung and thus of ingress of air with reactor fire.

In 2008, a FZJ report by Moormann was published, in which the excessively strong radioactive contamination of the reactor to inadequate monitoring of the reactor core as well as a longer-lasting operation is due at impermissibly high temperatures. This has, inter alia, meant that the fission products could emerge from the graphite nodules. Moormann emphasized that these are inherent problems of pebble bed reactors (ie not just an AVR problem) and the question arises whether the globular cluster principle is even feasible or justifiable.

Only in 1999 it was discovered that the AVR- bottom reflector on which the pebble rests, was broken in the operation and that about a few hundred fuel has jammed in the crack formed or are passing like as fragments. These fuel elements were largely not be removed. There are no studies on possible safety implications of this event.

The former officers of the former construction consortium Urban Cleve, which works closely today with the controversial LaRouche movement, on the other hand refers to the original safety report that these incidents allegedly already considered; he therefore denies any danger. At conferences, including the LaRouche movement, Cleveland continued to claim, in the AVR reactor was intentionally twice the GAU or even the worst-case scenario has been brought about without anything happened. Moormann makes the observation that in the AVR while the reactor is running at throttled cooling and shutdown rods had not been retracted, and the reactor was turned off automatically for a limited period; this experiment, but only in small experimental pebble-bed reactors ( such as AVR HTR -10 ) with very low power and power density is feasible, but not in commercial pebble bed reactors, since it would then be more severe damages. In addition, defined by the supervisory authority GAU the AVR is in no way said of Cleveland scenario, but on a massive flooding incident in the ongoing under full load reactor. The significant impact of the real flooding of 1978 in the AVR show Moormann's view that the meltdown at the pebble bed reactor is by no means harmless. Reinforced would apply the for the worst-case scenario, ie about the graphite fire. How Cleveland is also referred to the head of the reactor technology of the FZJ, Allelein, the AVR in April 2011 as probable. However, Cleveland sees the current concepts of pebble reactors, such as those developed in South Africa and China, as very promising to.

Since 2011, a report for the NRW state government from 1988 is available, which serious safety deficiencies on pebble reactors - especially the AVR - names. This includes in particular the above-discussed risk prompt Überkritikalitäten during incidents with intrusion of liquid water in the core at a critical reactor, which can have a catastrophic destruction to the equipment. The risk prompt Überkritikalitäten is confirmed by other authors. In this security advisory opinion of the pebble bed reactor is from Chernobyl Syndrome spoken and pointed out that the operating team the AVR reactor, than during the aforementioned incident of 1978, liquid water flowed into the reactor, even has rendered nuclear critical for three days, that they the reactor protection system inadmissible manipulated. Although this was a serious matter and the AVR GmbH was warned by the NRW Nuclear only. Furthermore, criticizes the opinion that inadequate shutdown system of the AVR: The installed outside the globular cluster shutdown rods were not enough to shut down, but it had to be additionally maintained over an electrically heated auxiliary boiler a minimum temperature of 130 ° C in the reactor core, or it had a few thousand fuel be taken to prevent uncontrolled re-criticality: on March 28, 1977, the AVR was due to excessive cooling of the globular cluster at decommissioned reactor despite the stowed shutdown rods inadvertently critical, but could - without causing damage - are returned to a manageable condition. Other safety deficiencies relate to a completely inadequate protection against aircraft crash and terrorist attacks. Presumably this security advisory has contributed significantly to the decision, the reactor shut down in late 1988.

The submissions by Rainer Moormann are mainly viewed from globular clusters supporters as destructive, but occasionally also referred to the ground as helpful that all findings on experimental nuclear power plant AVR can help to come for the future to a better design of the high temperature reactor. For its made ​​against considerable resistance of the globular clusters advocates and become part of the FZJ revelations Moormann received the whistleblower Price 2011.

A reappraisal of the AVR- past by FZJ and AVR GmbH did not take place in spite of the at least since the beginning of 2006 compacted evidence of concealed massive irregularities long time. Only immediately after the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, FZJ and the AVR GmbH employed a group of independent experts, which digest the history of the AVR and should take particular to the revelations of Moormann position. In April 2014, a report available, which should also be publicly available and can be discussed in public in the second quarter of 2014 with the authors.

Leukemia cases in children in the region Jülich

Around 1990 it came into the Jülich neighboring places Titz and low trim to a very significant increase of leukemia in children. FZJ closed then radioactive emissions from FZJ and AVR as causative factors. The workup of the AVR- water intrusion incident of 1978 and the AVR - operation, however, indicate that uncontrolled radioactive tritium emissions have occurred primarily via groundwater on a large scale ( see here), and that it is the neither the groundwater monitoring wells still in pre-1995 waterworks has given analyzes for tritium, so that the former tritium exposure of the population is no longer traceable. Although It would be a causal relationship between the leukemia cases and the tritium emissions are not derivable, on the other hand geriete the exclusion of radioactive emissions from AVR / FZJ as the cause of leukemia falter.

Dismantling, disposal

The reactor vessel is initially not disassemble, since which is considered virtually impossible because of its high contamination for the next decades. In November 2008, he was instead filled with 500 cubic meters of cellular lightweight concrete, so as to fix the radioactively contaminated high Graphitstaubteilchen and stabilize the container. This process had already been tested many times in securing ailing Russian nuclear submarines in Murmansk EWN. Originally in 2011, according to current plans ( from April 2014) in September 2014 to the 2100 -ton containers are lifted by 7 cranes from his position and then removed in January 2015 with a multi-wheel carriage for the interim storage of some detours in a 300 meters, newly built hall be transported so that the 90Sr with radioactively contaminated soil or groundwater can be cleaned under the reactor. The delays in dismantling beat with currently about 1.3 million € / month alone in personnel costs to book. After eliminating the above-ground buildings sheet piling must be 17 m deep into the ground and then the ground water to be pumped in the reactor area to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination during demolition work on the foundation before demolition of the reactor foundation. About the actual method for soil-groundwater purification can only be taken if, in demolition of the foundation detailed information about the contamination situation. And only then can an appropriate approval process can be started. Previous measurements in less contaminated areas already showed that the strontium concentration of 1200 Bq / kg by up a factor of 2 above the safety threshold (release value for soil excavation by the Radiation Protection Ordinance, since October 2011: 0.6 Bq ( Sr) / g) is. 2008 has been discussed in professional circles, may not be completely clean for reasons of cost the entire earth, but only the upper layers. For the deeper layers of invoices should be shown only if necessary, that they pose no danger. It plays a role that a sufficient number of analyzes would involve the detection of strontium elimination with unjustifiably high cost. That would be legally permissible, but would be contrary to public promises of AVR / ECN. In this context, the low intervention levels for strontium in water are (3 Bq 90Sr / l) and for soil surfaces after Radiation Protection Ordinance to consider (2 Bq 90Sr/kg floor). In the opinion of critics, the AVR - location remains so despite reorganization long term radioactive contaminated area.

Another problem is the very strong radiation of the reactor vessel, which is reached in the transport phase, according to calculations the permissible limits at the fence of the system practically. Preliminary measurements on the backfilled with concrete tanks showed that the radiation could be by up to a factor of 130 higher. Recent results indicate that the latter is not strong radiation was emitted from the container, but by components outside of the container. In January 2011, the AVR GmbH has requested a change of the transport permit of the reactor vessel to be able to use with the goal instead of a cushion of air carriage many wheeled vehicle. Since this could be remotely controlled and the transport time would be reduced, one hopes it a reduction of radiation exposure. Cost of the original 2015 to terminating part demolition are estimated by the federal government to more than 600 million euros. In 1988 they went from only DM 39 million, which was about the reserves of operators for disposal. But it soon turned out that the disposal costs would be considerably higher and would exceed the financial capacity of the AVR- owner; therefore took Bund ( 90%) and NRW ( 10%) of the cost of disposal even in the first decommissioning phase. During this period of 1988-2003, ie, before the acquisition of AVR by EWN, dismantling costs have already been incurred of € 200 million, without decisive progress has been made. These older are not included in the current cost statements of EWN generally, which has led to occasional misinterpretations regarding the total cost. From 2003, the date of the acquisition of AVR by ECN, the cost of acquisition to 70 % Federal Government and 30 % NRW has changed. The reinstatement costs are those of the NPP Stade, which had 40 times the power, and approximately 100 times the amount of electricity generated, significantly exceed: in 2002, decommissioned nuclear power plant Stade is built back in 2015 at a cost of less than € 500 million. Only after a further decay of at least 60 years of AVR cask should eventually be dismantled by robots and converted into a repository. The problem regarding disposal of the reactor vessel is the very high content of graphite and charcoal stone installations at 14C (half-life = 5730 years ), since this would at 14C exploit the allowable in the Konrad repository total activity of at least 75 %. Source of 14C is mostly nitrogen, which was present as an impurity, especially in coal and stone was also used for reactor shutdown: Nitrogen reacts by (n, p) reaction ( neutron and proton release ) with high yield at 14C. A disposal of the container in the Konrad mine so that is practically out of the question. The 14C - problem was only in 2000 after sampling obvious: The calculations based on the Jülich information on AVR inventory had previously underestimated the amount of 14C by a factor of 25. Critics see this as evidence for an insufficiently intensive and careful employment of FZJ with disposal issues of pebble bed reactors. A shipment of cut AVR- container ( 500 m³ without packaging) in the planned in Germany repository for heat-generating waste, the disposal costs would increase five-fold compared to the Konrad mine but according to preliminary estimates, at least. Discussed is therefore also a separate, surface- and site -level repository for the AVR reactor vessel modeled after French plan repository for 14C nuclear waste. In addition, currently being considered by FZJ, with the support of the BMBF within the project CarboDISP whether the approved limit for 14C in Konrad (400 TBq ) can be raised subsequently. The from 2015 (2022) costs have not been estimated.

AVR- axletree nuclear waste in the Asse II trial

101 barrels of approx 50000-55000 irradiated AVR graphite nodules without nuclear fuel (only the number of barrels has been documented, the number of balls in total contained was estimated from Jülich later 2010) and 8 barrels that contained, among other things, in research reactors for testing purposes irradiated AVR fuel element balls (number of fuel elements still unknown), have already been incorporated in the 1973-78 trial Asse. The embedded AVR graphite nodules contained far more tritium and 14C durable than in the Asse was allowed. This Jülich has not declared correctly in the storage, but it has disposed of the nodule containers as weakly radioactive in Asse. As the unacceptably high radioactivity inventory from 2008 struck through off-gassing tritium, FZJ had to make late entries for the discarded into the aces radioactivity. This makes the total known tritium inventory of aces increased by more than a factor of 10 FZJ justified the 2010 so that they had during the storage of tritium and 14C can not yet measure. Meanwhile, however, documents were available showing that Jülich had precise knowledge of its high activity inventory before the Asse nuclear waste storage of his and therefore possibly made ​​specifically and extensively in the illegal retention of aces. In addition, there is the suspicion that broken AVR fuel elements could have been introduced into the aces, possibly as a content of the above 8 barrels with a medium level waste. Already during storage in the Aces Jülich was noticed in samples by falsely declared barrels.

Since 1974 it was clear that the originally planned reprocessing of AVR fuel elements in the Jülich plant JUPITER would not be feasible, on the other hand, however, no adequate storage facilities for the resulting spent fuel were provided Jülich tried to reach a disposal by incorporation in the Asse. On October 6, 1975, a storage permit was applied for and on March 4, 1976, the approval by the Physikalisch -Technische Bundesanstalt and the mining authority Clausthal for the storage of 100,000 AVR fuel elements with a total activity of up to 81,000 TBq in the Asse was final, the first on 30. expired in June 1978. A permit for an additional 60,000 AVR fuel elements has been requested. The ball containers should be so assembled that they were after the then legal at the upper limit of medium- level waste. For storage, the AVR - fuel on a large scale, there was at that time not only because the population is spread around the aces under the leadership of the Deputy District Administrator of Wolfenbüttel, Reinhold Stoevesandt, political and legal ways and through public campaigns to fight back. The storage would have multiplied the radioactive materials in the Asse.

For more details on AVR nuclear waste in the Asse be found in the summary reports of the Committee of Parliament of Lower Saxony to the Aces (2012 ).

AVR- Castor: interim storage and the Way Forward

Since 1993, approximately 290,000 spent fuel balls are stored in 152 Castor containers in a temporary camp on the FZJ - site. Its approval was as predictable for a long time, from mid-2013, as required security credentials for an extension proven to be difficult; also feared the FZJ Board majority that the further fate of the nuclear liabilities at FZJ could tarnish his reputation. Therefore, the proposed research, the Castor containers to transfer to the interim storage facility ( by truck or rail ). This led in 2010 to massive protests throughout NRW. Also in Jülich a citizens' initiative formed against these plans. In March 2012 it was announced that the approval for storage in Ahaus can not be issued in time, as the quality of the application documents from Jülich is insufficient. FZJ therefore decided to make an application for an extension of the Jülich camp until 2016. In July 2012, plans for the FZJ public to dispose of the 152 Castor in the U.S.. Background is the willingness of the U.S. to withdraw problematic nuclear fuel proliferation of view when it was delivered from the U.S.. This is especially true for typical low spent fuel from material test reactors whose spent fuel still contain large amounts of highly enriched uranium. At the relatively high burnup fuel of the AVR, it is doubtful whether at all there is a significant risk of proliferation and whether this argument is possibly simply put forward to justify a nuclear export. An indisputable higher Proliferationsrisisiko other hand, have only low spent fuel elements from the THTR -300, which are located in Ahaus. In November 2012, the Supervisory Board of the FZJ decided formally to withdraw the draft by mid-2013 shift of Castor to Ahaus and to begin planning for a new storage facility at Jülich. At the transport plans in the United States as an alternative but is held with high priority. The 152 Castor contain almost the entire nuclear fuel element, the AVR - electricity generation ( 1.5 billion kWh ); this electricity generation accounts for only less than a current German daily needs ( 2011). This underscores the extremely high volume of radioactive waste at Pebble reactors. A stress test was not the Jülich Castor bearing only German interim storage 2013. Since the expiry of the approval of the interim storage facility on 30.06.2013 storage due to a nuclear arrangement of Düsseldorf supervisory authority is tolerated limited. Further attempts by FZJ, demonstrate the safety of the interim storage, were not successful within a given time by the end of 2013. To meet the minimum safety requirements, therefore, the interim storage is to be provided in early 2014 with a massive concrete wall to protect against terrorist plane crashes. Thus, the possibility of a longer-term extension of the storage permit disclosure could.

As far as the aforementioned USA option does not apply, the following must be considered: The Castor containers are permitted only as a transport and intermediate storage tank with a useful life of about 40 years, not as a repository container. The balls have to be reloaded into a suitable container for final disposal before. Due to the flammability and the leachability of the balls have to be conditioned prior to disposal as well, ie be brought into a form suitable for final disposal. The previously proposed to be embedded in concrete is likely to no longer meet the growing security demands. Therefore, the embedding in SiC ceramics was proposed. This conditioning shall be carried out for the 600,000 THTR fuel elements located in Ahaus, so planning a joint conditioning plant for the entire fuel element debris from pebble reactors are required. As a conditioning plant for the spherical fuel is predicted by the BMU and the built in Gorleben PKA ( pilot conditioning plant ) are conceivable, which has met with local citizens' initiatives resistance. According to information from the BMBF, the U.S. require about € 450 million for the acquisition of AVR- Castor.

"Atomic Ball affair " 2011

In April 2011 it was announced through a small request of the Green that radioactive fuel 2285 balls are to be gone missing. This led to a substantial media attention throughout Germany and became known under the name " atomic ball affair ". The NRW Economics Minister Svenja Schulze suspected that these fuel balls could also have been brought to the trial Asse. However, this was no longer understandable, as in the experimental repository " stored quantities are not known ." It was further reported that in experimental Asse no fuel could be stored, since it was only approved for the storage of low and intermediate level radioactive waste. However, the admissibility of the deposition of AVR fuel elements in the Aces is a misjudgment, as explained in the Asse chapter.

The research contradicted the accusations about missing fuel assemblies and assured that the stock of fuel elements which had been documented " up to the nearest milligram ." Harry Voigt Berger (SPD ), Minister of Economic Affairs in the cabinet power I admitted a faulty communication on the part of the state government and said:. " For the Nuclear Regulatory of the country is crucial that no amount of fissile material missing " mid-July 2011, constituted a committee of the NRW parliament to clarify the questions about the possibly missing AVR fuel elements. The committee documents were available showing that there has been confusion in Jülich AVR fuel cans and that sampling a different content of fuel cans were as declared. Furthermore, it became clear that a detailed documentation of the whereabouts of several thousand irradiated fuel for experimental purposes or were destroyed in the reactor does not exist. Only inaccurately known also is the number of fuel assemblies that could not be removed from the reactor (see Incidents ). Both of the state ministries as well as representatives from the Federal Ministry of Research laxity " nonchalant " was reprimanded approach of the research center for the documentation of the balls before the committee of inquiry, which have ultimately led to uncertainty in the fate of the balls. A committee in the internal AVR- sighted document fissile material accountancy AVR and FZJ for the IAEA concludes: The foregoing ... may give the impression that the fuel element detection have been a mess on the AVR. It is, however, to remember that the AVR reactor was the first of its kind ....

Overall, the committee found, although no evidence of a movement of 2285 AVR fuel elements in the aces, but for an unreasonably careless Jülich handling of the fuel. Because of the early NRW Landtag elections in 2012 the Investigative Committee ended without a final report. Since the essential aspects were elucidated, was also used by the opposition of CDU and FDP, which had called this committee to life, will not seek re -establishment of the new legislature.