Democratic deficit in the European Union

The democratic deficit of the European Union is a common slogan with which the assessment will be referred to that the European Union is not sufficient democratic legitimacy in their political activities. Among the critics refers a part to the lack of a European public people, and sees this as a "structural democratic deficit "; others refer to shortcomings of the political system of the European Union and criticize a " institutional democracy deficit".

At the same time development and expansion of European integration since the early days after the Second World War are also characterized by an increasing shift of power within the EU institutional framework, which was accompanied by an increasing strengthening democracy proper components. This is particularly evident in the changing role of the European Parliament, which has gradually grown from an institution not directly elected, advisory only a co-equal with the Council of Ministers in almost all areas of a legislative body.

The difficult manageable EU Treaty wickerwork is not transparent; the large number of regulations and standards prescribed very special kind, which shall be adopted by the EU institutions in the internal market, calls criticism of the " Brussels bureaucracy " produced and nourishes at national and regional level reservations and opposition to a " Eurocrats ". In the emphasis on the subsidiarity principle, the introduction of a citizenship of the Union, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and in the strengthening of opportunities for participation of EU citizens but will also opposing impulses.

• 3.1 Intergouvernementalistische arguments
• 3.2 Federalist arguments
• 3.3 view, the Federal Constitutional Court

Structural democratic deficit

Without uniform state people, the critics of the structural democratic deficit, it lacked the EU to elementary democratic legitimacy. The diversity of languages ​​and the lack of " European media " admit no pan-European political and public discourse. The existing media are not only linguistically but also in content oriented mainly on national issues. Without a Europe-wide public but could be created "European country people" no common identity of a. So far there are only a few approaches to address this problem, such as the Franco-German channel ARTE or euro news. The English language as a lingua franca could not overcome the problem of linguistic diversity, since many people lack the appropriate vocabulary in order to pursue or cause political disputes appropriately.

Critics of the structural democratic deficit are strongly represented in the ranks of the so-called intergovernmentalists who want to limit the EU to a mere intergovernmental cooperation and refuse additional responsibilities for the supranational institutions (eg European Commission and European Parliament). An important representative of this criticism is, for example, Prof. Karl Albrecht shaft Schneider, who was among others in 1993 complainant the Federal Constitutional Court against the Act Approving the Treaty of Maastricht. In the so-called Maastricht decision, the Federal Constitutional Court dealt with the question of whether participation of the Federal Republic in the European Union is compatible with the democratic principle of the Basic Law and was doing deals with the problems of the lack of European sovereign people. The judgment leads for the EU, the term " federation of states " and demands as a prerequisite for membership of Germany that " a connection from the people legitimacy and influence is also secured within an association of states ". In this context, the Federal Constitutional Court negated, although the existence of a European state's population, but saw this not as a necessary condition for the democratic legitimacy of the EU at: Rather, the EU get legitimacy for sovereign tasks of the national parliaments, representing the state peoples of the Member States. The Federal Constitutional Court stressed that democratic legitimacy in the EU can not be made ​​in the same form " as within a uniform and exhaustive regulated by a state constitutional system of government ."

The European Parliament has been construed by the Federal Constitutional Court as a representation of the constituent peoples, " of the supplement poses a democratic support of the European Union policy." The European Union continues to this view, so no State which directly supported by a European nation, but nevertheless compatible with the democratic principle of the Basic Law. Thus, the Constitutional Court rejected the criticism of a structural democratic deficit of the European Union.

Institutional democracy deficit

More common than the criticism of a structural democratic deficit is the institutional democratic deficit of the European Union. Here are their respective influence and the interaction of the EU institutions at the center of criticism. A democratic deficit is according to this view is that the advocacy and political participation of EU citizens in the existing institutional structure is not sufficiently guaranteed. In the Toussaint report in 1988, the European Parliament defined the " democratic deficit in the European Community " as

" Combination of two phenomena: ( i) the transfer of powers from the Member States to the European Communities; ( ii ) to adopt the exercise of these powers at Community level by institutions other than the European Parliament, even if prior to the transfer, the national parliaments had the authority in the affected areas laws. "

The focus of the criticism here is mainly the EU Council of Ministers. This is the EU's main legislative body, but consists of members of the respective national governments. This form of executive federalism means that the Council the powers between the ( supranational ) and legislative ( national ) executive is not taking place. Thus, it was possible that national governments were spiked with appropriate education in the majority of Ministers in the position to introduce legislation on the detour of the EU without parliamentary scrutiny. The introduction of the codecision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament, however, was the Council assimilated in the legislature, so that such a " game about gang" to legislation throughout in most policy fields without parliamentary involvement is no longer possible. Nevertheless, the criticism of institutional democracy deficit for various other reasons will be further maintained.

Among the critics of the institutional democratic deficit can be distinguished with a contrary objective intergovernmentalists and European Federalists. While the former are against the transfer of further powers to the EU and instead call for a strengthening of the national parliaments, the Federalists specifically apply for the strengthening of the European Parliament. Somewhat simplified, the intergovernmentalists demand rather " less," the Federalists rather " more Europe".

Intergouvernementalistische criticism

Intergovernmentalists who argue with the institutional democratic deficit of the EU accuse usually to acquire competencies in policy areas which should be addressed usefully by the principle of subsidiarity at the national level. In particular, the following critical points play a role:

• A too far -reaching regulation by well-intentioned attempts and / or a desire for power. An example here is about the decision adopted on 20 March 2000 Directive 2000/9/EC relating to cableway installations designed to carry persons, after also flachländische countries such as Berlin and Mecklenburg- Vorpommern must legislate for cableways (see about the country funicular Act ( Mecklenburg- Vorpommern) ).

• The above shown "Game Over Gang", by which, according to critics, the national parliaments to effectively control their own government is impossible.

• So-called package decisions in the Council of Ministers, which summarized extraneous issues and be adopted jointly. This coming from the perspective of intergouvernementalistischen critics concluded many decisions which would otherwise have found no majority. This, too, carry on to overregulation.

• The decisions of the European Court of Justice. This is the contract of " creating an ever closer union " committed. Therefore, according to the critics it is inclined in its judgments to interpret the EU Treaties and the EU centralized awarding more and more responsibilities.

As a solution of this democracy or subsidiarity problems is proposed by intergouvernementalistischer side to relieve the Council of its role as " guardian of subsidiarity " and to build instead of his four new subsidiarity guard. These are:

Federalist criticism

The European federalists who seek a European federal state in the long-term perspective, demand especially the consistent democratization of the European decision-making and legislative process. One criticism is that the European Parliament is still not in all policy areas has full right of participation. Also in the legislation lacks the right of initiative, which rests solely with the Commission, but not to choose one by the Parliament, but only to confirm ( or reject ) is. The European Parliament has therefore only indirectly affect the activities of the Commission.

Partial controversial is the distribution of seats in the European Parliament, where each Member State is entitled to a certain quota of seats. In this case, submitted in accordance with the principle of " falling proportionality" small, sparsely populated countries such as Malta proportionately much more MPs than populous countries such as Germany. A deputy from Malta took until 2009 about 76,000 Europeans, a German deputy represented 826,000 while EU citizens. This Disproportionality is regarded as a break with the fundamental democratic principle of equality.

At the EU legislative process is also criticized a lack of accountability of the decisions. There is a variety of actors who are involved in the standard-setting process, at the same time but no decision-making center. This leads to diffusion of responsibility or to a system of organized irresponsibility. Precondition for democratic legitimacy however, was that the elected representatives can be held responsible ( by deselecting or dismissal ).

As a solution to the democratic deficit, it would be necessary first of all from a federal point of view, expand the European Parliament to a full Parliament. This could for example be done through the establishment of a bicameral system in which the Council would act as a representation of national interests, the Parliament, however, in all areas of legislation would be equal - possibly along the lines of the relationship between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in Germany. Further requirements would be the election of the European Commission by the parliament and the election of the Parliament not by national airline seats, but as with Europe-wide party lists.

Changes caused by the Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon substantially follows the since the introduction of direct elections to the Parliament in 1979 and the co-decision procedure by the EEA in 1987 discernible tendency to strengthen both the competences of the EU and the democratic elements within the EU gradually. While federalist critics see therefore fulfills some of their demands, fear intergouvernementalistische critics solidification of the existing deficits. These concerns are also regarded as one of the reasons for the failure of the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2005. With the European Citizens' Initiative, the Lisbon Treaty introduced for the first time an instrument of direct democracy in the European Union.

Intergouvernementalistische arguments

From intergouvernementalistischer view threatens the Lisbon Treaty, the EU further centralization. So the catalog specified in the contract of EU powers was not clear enough; by the "mixed competence " was possible a dynamic acquisition of competences by the EU.

The inserted in the Treaty the EU's commitment to the principle of subsidiarity is the most intergouvernementalistischen critics not go far enough. Although national parliaments are now able to pronounce for breaches of the principle of subsidiarity complaints, but these are not binding. Another point of criticism is the so-called passerelle control by which it should be possible in the future to transform the Council of Ministers of unanimity in majority decisions. Although the national parliaments have, however, a six-month right of appeal; However, it is feared that the practical implementation of this law will be difficult.

The demand for a competence court was not included in the Lisbon Treaty; the seen by critics intergouvernementalistischen problem of pro-European bias of the European Court therefore would still exist.

Finally, it is criticized that except in Ireland there has been a referendum on the EU reform essential in any EU Member State.

Federalist arguments

The lack of a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is also a major point of criticism of the Federalists; however, is usually required by this place a number of national referendums a common ordination across Europe, through which the contract would be ratified.

Content, it brings numerous benefits from a federal perspective. The recent extension of the competences of the European Parliament states is usually considered to be crucial. Thus, the co-decision procedure (hereinafter: " Ordinary legislative procedure " ) are now applied in more policy areas, particularly in the hitherto purely intergovernmental organized police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In addition, falls under the Treaty of Lisbon, the distinction between " compulsory " and "non - compulsory " expenditure away; Parliament therefore has thus full participation rights across the entire EU budget, including the agricultural expenditure.

Furthermore, it should be increased by the Lisbon Treaty, the transparency of decisions in the Council of Ministers: This must now always when he will legislate, to meet in public. Other federal requirements, such as the right of initiative for the European Parliament, the election of the Commission by Parliament or Parliament election for pan-European lists to overcome the degressive proportionality of the allocation of seats, however, are not found in the Treaty of Lisbon.

Vision of the Federal Constitutional Court

In its judgment of 30 June 2009 on the Treaty of Lisbon ( Lisbon judgment ), the Federal Constitutional Court reaffirms its scale in the Maastricht judgment line, according to which the EU is not a federal state and should not be, as long as the Basic Law applies and the German people a such a step did not approve in a referendum. The EU's structural problem lies in the fact that the European integration, the scope of policy-making power of the Union - has grown steadily and significantly, so that now in some policy areas, the European Union a state corresponding to - - not least by the Treaty of Lisbon was designed - state analogue. In contrast, the internal decision-making and appointment procedures remained predominantly bound by international law analogous to the pattern of an international organization; the EU is still substantially constructed according to the principle of equality of states.

The Federal Constitutional Court addresses the risk that the EU institutions to independently develop while a trend towards political " self-reinforcement " had. Specifically, reference is made to the extensive expertise in interpreting the meaning of the Implied Powers Doctrine and the effet utile - rule. As written in the Member States peoples but the relevant public authority, including the Union violence remained, lies the primary " responsibility for integration " in the hands of acting for the peoples national constitutional bodies. Therefore, national security mechanisms, reminders are issued against an erosion of the policy-making capacity of States and the principle of conferral of powers by the Federal Constitutional Court.

On the role of the European Parliament states with regard to the question of democratic deficit:

" In terms of constitutional government requirements, it lacks the European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon on a same choice by all EU citizens materialize -down political decision-making body with the ability for the uniform representation of the popular will. It lacks so coherently, in addition to a system of government organization, in which a European majority will pay the government education so that he goes back to free and equal choices and can culminate in a genuine and transparent for citizens contest between government and opposition. The European Parliament is also after the reformulation in article 14, paragraph 2 TEU Lisbon and counter- claim, the Article 10 para 1 TEU Lisbon seems to rise according to its wording, no representative body of a sovereign European nation. This is reflected in the fact that it is not designed as a representation of the people in the respective designated national contingents of Representatives, representing the citizens of the Union as undifferentiated unity on the principle of electoral equality. "

It should be sufficiently prepared, therefore, neither in composition nor in the European competence structure to meet representative and assignable majority decisions as a unified political direction and not appointed within the supranational balancing of interests among the States to relevant policy routing decisions. It therefore could not support a parliamentary government and organize themselves in the government - opposition party politics so that a direction decision by the European electorate could politically decisive move to action.

To observe the effectiveness of the electoral law and the preservation of democratic self- determination, it was necessary that the Federal Constitutional Court within its jurisdiction wake the fact that the Union force not by its acts violated the constitutional identity and not seen exceeds the competences conferred on it.

In its judgment on the Lisbon Treaty, the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed its view that the elections to the European Parliament for citizens involvement would provide a complementary way to the vermittele a sufficient level of legitimation. However, the European Parliament is still a representation of the peoples of the Member States and not a European citizenship. This is evidenced by a rating contradiction. On the one hand is based the concept of the internal market that it should make no difference, from which Member State a product / service or an employee / contractor comes (prohibition of discrimination ). On the other hand, argue that the criterion of nationality crucial for the political influence of citizens in the European Union. This means that the EU was in an Appreciation contrary to the basis of their identity as citizens of the Union.

The degressive proportional representation of citizens in the European Parliament adopted the Treaty of Lisbon even back to something. According to the Treaty of Nice, Spain and Luxembourg were the two extremes: In Spain 50 seats came to 46 million people, or 917,000 population per seat in Luxembourg 6 seats to 0.5 million inhabitants, ie 82,000 inhabitants per seat ( Disproportionality: 11.2 ). After the Treaty of Lisbon the extreme cases Germany with 96 seats to 82 million inhabitants and Malta with 6 seats to 0.4 million inhabitants will be. A German deputy then represents approximately 854,000 inhabitants, a Maltese 67,000 ( Disproportionality of 12.8 ).

Debate

Since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty proposals for institutional evolutions are avoided. 2009 called for the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble democratization by means of direct election of the President of the European Council by the citizens of the Union, which he repeated in the course of the euro crisis 2011.

The EU's EUR -Lex database allows at least some transparency in EU policy thicket. Also a search in German language and the reading of EU treaties and laws is possible there.