Election threshold

A restrictive clause prevents a proportional representation that smaller parties are represented in Parliament. This is a " fragmentation " of the Parliament can be counteracted.

A distinction is primarily a de facto barrier clause (also called natural barrier clause) of an explicit lock clause. In a de facto barrier clause a certain minimum number of votes required by the electoral system as such implicitly in order to gain a seat, for example through the seat allocation process. If a fixed number of seats to be awarded, then a party requires a minimum number of votes to get a seat. The number of " minimum votes " is not defined in the Act. For an explicit barrier clause is the height of the barrier required by law ( for example, 5 % of the votes cast ). Is only " restrictive clause " is mentioned, an explicit restrictive clause is usually meant.

Purpose of explicit restrictive clauses

The objective justification of restrictive clauses are to prevent the " fragmentation " of the allocation of seats and thus enable a stable majority to form a government and secure.

Without blocking clauses are often found in proportional elections, many small parties in Parliament, partly factions. This makes it difficult to form a government. Often the majority coalition is only just in such a case, so that small and micro parties can get a relatively high weight in decisions.

Through a restrictive clause, the number of parties in parliament reduced. At the same time it modifies the equality of choice, which is why the introduction and the height of a restrictive clause against the danger posed by the party fragmentation, must be weighed.

Restrictive clauses in different states

Restrictive clauses in German-speaking countries

Germany

Restrictive clauses in Germany there - each in the amount of 5 percent - in the general election and all elections of the state legislatures. In municipal elections, there are no restrictive clauses (more). In the election for the Bremen city citizenship continues to be a restrictive clause in the amount of 5 % applies. In Berlin goes for the elections to the Borough Assemblies explicit hurdle rate of 3 percent. The existing restrictive clause (3 percent) of the elections to the comparable district assemblies in Hamburg was rejected in January 2013 by the Hamburg Constitutional Court.

The introduction of the five - percent threshold was established in the Federal Republic of Germany with the fact that the absence of a restrictive clause had increased fragmentation in the Weimar Republic. At that time, up to 17 parties were represented in the Reichstag.

The minimum threshold for the Bundestag is - governed by § 6 paragraph 3 of the Federal Electoral Act - July 8, 1953. Accordingly, a party must nationwide at least five percent of the vote, to feed in the Bundestag. This five-percent hurdle, however, can be overcome by the basic mandate clause: If a party wins at least three direct mandates, pulling it with one their percentage share of the vote nationwide, a corresponding number of seats in the Bundestag. It shall not apply to parties of national minorities.

The Federal Constitutional Court declared the five-percent electoral threshold at the federal level in its case-law so far basically to be constitutional, in which it stressed that " the compatibility of a restrictive clause with the principle of electoral equality one can not be judged once and for all abstract"; the current conditions, so be taken into account. In some states, the electoral threshold at the local level was abolished due to changed views of the judiciary.

Explicit exceptions to the restrictive clause apply at the federal level according to § 6 paragraph 6, sentence 2 BWahlG and in some countries (eg Schleswig- Holstein to § 3 para 1 sentence 2 SchlHWahlG ) on National Minorities. This is relevant especially in Schleswig -Holstein during the derogation for the Danish minority, which represents the SSW.

For elections to the European Parliament, the German Bundestag passed the Law on the Election of Members of the European Parliament from the Federal Republic of Germany ( European Elections Act ). As amended on 8 March 1994, it provides for a minimum threshold of 5 percent in § 2 paragraph 7. The Federal Constitutional Court declared the scheme on 9 November 2011 to be incompatible with the Basic Law. In support of this decision, which differs from the evaluation of the blocking clauses for national elections, the judges referred to structural differences between the EU Parliament and the German Bundestag: The EU Parliament choose no government that is reliant upon its continuing support. That the work of the Parliament will unreasonably difficult by the collection of other small parties, are impossible to make. The CDU Federal Party and some SPD state associations then demanded the end of 2012 the substitute introduction of a three-percent hurdle in European elections; the CSU preference to the establishment of constituencies and conversion to d' Hondt, which would also lead to a significant increase of the de facto restrictive clause. In November 2012, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which the Member States are invited to take "appropriate and reasonable minimum threshold " for the allocation of seats to introduce.

% Electoral threshold excluded alarming 15.7 % of the vote - in the federal election in 2013 were the 5.

On 13 June 2013, the German Bundestag approved a three percent electoral threshold for the European Parliament elections. In contrast, several smaller parties announced an action before the Federal Constitutional Court, as well as the non-partisan association organizes more democracy currently a civil suit against the law. On February 26, 2014, the court announced the verdict with the tenor that the three-percent threshold clause is unconstitutional. To justify differentiating regulations on electoral equality and equal opportunities of the parties need a specific, factual legitimacy, "compelling " reason. This is not the case, the Senate majority opinion. The judgment takes in its reasoning with regard to the judgment of 9 November 2011. Thus, for the 2014 European elections no threshold.

Liechtenstein

In Liechtenstein applies to the Liechtenstein Landtag elections to a restrictive clause of 8%. After the introduction of universal suffrage in 1918, initially was considered a Majorzwahlrecht without blocking clause. As part of the truce between the various parties Liechtenstein in 1936 converted to a proportional representation and also anchored a minimum threshold of 18% in the election law. In 1962, the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court struck down the restrictive clause because it contradicted the constitution. In 1973 finally set the current minimum threshold of 8% was added to the state constitution.

Austria

In Austria, a four- percent threshold in elections to the National Council and in the state elections in Burgenland, Lower Austria and Upper Austria exists. In state elections in the majority of states, namely Vienna, Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg and Carinthia, sets a higher five-percent hurdle in Styria there are in state elections no (explicit ) restrictive clause. The achievement of a basic mandate leads to the circumvention of the restrictive clause, but is in Styria basic condition for representation in parliament.

Switzerland

In Switzerland, there are no restrictive clauses in elections at federal level (National Council and Council of States). However, know five of the 26 Swiss cantons restrictive clauses in varying amounts for election to the respective cantonal parliament. The cantons of Vaud and Zurich each have a five-percent hurdle, the Canton of Geneva sees a ten- percent threshold for elections to the cantonal or Grand Council before a seven - percent threshold and the canton of Neuchatel. The canton of Basel-Stadt has replaced since 2012 when the previous five-percent hurdle by a split by electoral districts four- percent threshold.

Overview of the blocking clauses in European countries

Overview of the blocking clauses in other countries

Countries without blocking clauses

There are several countries without blocking clauses, such as Portugal, South Africa, Finland and Macedonia. You have proportional representation systems without a legal electoral threshold.

For the election of Libya's National Congress in 2012, there was no threshold for the 80 elected by proportional representation seats. This enabled 21 parties to enter parliament; 15 of these received only one seat more 120 of the 200 seats were assigned a priori to independent non-party deputies. A possible formation of a government by a few large parties is avoided in principle.

Criticism

The most significant criticism is that electoral systems with restrictive clauses would lead to distortions and would modify the equality of choice because votes are voided for failing at the restrictive clauses parties, and the remaining votes would it get a higher weight. Blocking clauses are also problematic as they might affect voting behavior. This could for electoral considerations, a "large party selected" are because the voice not of a party is to be "given away " that does not come Expected to set hurdle. On the other hand, a voice could also be assigned as Leihstimme to a party who might otherwise fail because of the restrictive clause. A much discussed possibility for limiting the tactical voting behavior without simultaneous lifting of the restrictive clause is the introduction of a replacement voice.

These arguments in a detailed examination ( dissertation Catón, 2009) has been relied upon before all, that they do not apply so. To run elections, which take place without a restrictive clause, just ( automatically ) to an ungovernable, would conversely lead blocking clauses governing capability. The choice context as a whole ( ie, historical tradition, traditional elements, Wahlkeisabgrenzungen ) and finally choice Rating systems give the world a diversity that is not easy to make a - two-dimensional viewing " proportional representation versus majoritarian " possible.

To secure the act of parliament and government blocking clauses are a widely accepted means in German politics. Some politicians see blocking clauses, in principle critical. So evaluates Hans- Christian Ströbele restrictive clauses as fundamentally undemocratic, since it would difficult for new political movements the way into parliament. Also criticized Ralf -Uwe Beck, civil rights activist and co-chairman of the association for more democracy, the status quo and named as a solution either " to reduce or abolish five per cent barrier clause " the or " a replacement voice for the voters, who assume that of their preferred party may stick to the restrictive clause. "