Coherentism
Coherence theory is called in philosophy a theory that the coherence ( a relationship ) with something else to the essence, the criterion or - does the evidence of a case - in a weak sense.
The concept of coherence (correlation ) is often vague. Some of consistency ( non-contradiction ) is used simply in the sense of consistency.
In a stricter sense of coherence is not only consistency ahead, but calls between the other sets ( justifications ) are derivative, justification and explanation relations. In this strict sense, there are different degrees of coherence.
- 2.2.1 Coherence and consistency
- 2.2.2 Komprehensivität
- 2.2.3 connection
- 7.1 coherence theories of truth
- 7.2 coherentist epistemologies
Coherence theories of truth
Coherence theories of truth (in the broad sense) seen in the coherence of a statement with other statements the truth of a statement, the ultimate (or only a supplementary ) criterion or an indication of the truth of a statement.
In the most common technical meaning the coherence theory of truth is a theory of truth that rises to the coherence criterion of truth.
- After a statement is true, if it is part of a coherent system of statements.
It is stated in the rule as a counter- position to the correspondence theory, which defines truth as " correspondence " between knowledge and reality. In the correspondence theory is about a coherence with reality, with the coherence theory to make it consistent with other statements.
The coherence theory is related to the consensus theory of truth, from which it was adapted.
Against the coherence theory is argued that it may give contradictory set of systems, a coherence to several other.
So is the statement that the earth revolved around the sun true in so far as it relates consistent with other statements of the Copernican worldview.
Coherence as an indication of the truth of a statement is uncontroversial.
The coherence theory came in the 17th century to rationalist, was partially and temporarily represented by Hegel and in the ( English ) idealism and the logical empiricism. Coherence theories often go hand in hand with holistic theories. The holism of Quine leads to a certain convergence with the correspondence theory.
Idealistic metaphysical theories teach that there is no ontological type difference between opinions and their truth-makers, but only mental entities. Idealists must reject correspondence theories of truth, therefore, obviously; because correspondence between mind and object just needed objects on the object side, which are not opinion like yourself again. It is therefore natural for idealistic theorists to join a variant of coherence theories.
The classic formulation of coherence theory comes from HH Joachim, one of the modern representatives of coherence theories of truth among others Nicholas Rescher ( for details see also: truth ).
Coherence theories of justification ( coherentism )
According to the coherence theory of justification (also: coherentism ) " is the justification of a belief in the individual membership in a system of beliefs, are the individual beliefs with each other [ ... ] in a variety of justification relations ".
Knowledge in the sense of justified opinion is then not only on a foundation nichtinferentiellen ( empirical ) knowledge or justified opining founded.
Opinions are, teach Kohärentisten justified only by relations with other opinions. Besides fundamentalist epistemologies ( some opinions are independent of relations to other opinions justified itself) are rejected by Kohärentisten reliabilistische theories ( some opinions are justified by the product to be reliable opinion-forming processes).
Taxonomy of coherence theories of justification
Coherence theories of justification have been divided into classes with different criteria.
Positive and negative coherence theories
Numerous coherence theorists distinguish positive and negative coherence theories. Gilbert Harman called a negative coherence theories as general foundations theory.
Negative coherence theories is called coherence theories which hold all convictions for first place as long as ( prima facie ) justified until something speaks against them. Harman calls this principle of positive undermining and Erik J. Olsson as a negative consolidation.
Closely related to negative coherence theories is the so-called Konservativismusprinzip, demzufolgte a subject is justified to keep his beliefs, as long as it does not have any reasons not to do so.
A problem for negative coherence theories is that negative coherence theories, according to astrological and religious beliefs are initially justified. Harman calls this objection as anti-religious objection.
Another objection is the paranoia objection, according to which a person is justified paranoia of his convictions a negative coherence theory is that.
Positive coherence theories is called coherence theories that assume that no belief is justified as long as there is nothing for them. A belief is justified if it reduces or increases the coherence of a belief system defects of a belief system. Olsson speaks of positive consolidation.
Arbitrary and communicative coherence theories
The distinction between positive and negative is not fully coherent theories. You can always correct even with a random evaluation as justified and not justified and begin this assessment, if there is any reason for or against conviction. This position is referred to as arbritäre coherence theory.
As initially justified beliefs can be considered that, etc. representing the parents or a scientific teacher, a textbook, only to correct also if something speaks for or against conviction. Such coherence theories are referred to as communicative coherence theories.
Computer simulations have shown that negative, positive, arbitrary and communicative coherence theories in the long run to the same belief systems.
Coherence theories with embedding degree
In some coherence theory, the relational coherence, ie the property is as well fit a belief to a belief system, a gradual property. One speaks in this case of coherence theories with embedding degree.
The coherence theories of Harold H. Joachim and Francis Herbert Bradley, when read as coherence theories of justification, coherence theories with embedding degree. Newer coherence theories with embedding degrees of BonJour, Thagard, Wang, Schoch and Wiedemann. This corresponds to Constraint Satisfaction theories ( Thagard, Wang, Schoch, Wiedemann ) the degree to have the considerations when the networks have found their balance.
Weighted and unweighted coherence theories
In most coherence theories of justification, the coherence of a belief amount is determined by inferences (eg statements ). If these inferences differed in their strength is referred to as weighted coherence theories, or of unweighted coherence theories. Examples of weighted coherence theories are those of Thagard, Bartel Borth, Wang, Schoch and Wiedemann.
Uncompromising and moderate coherence theories
As a compromise coherence theories is called coherence theories that are both unweighted as neither have embedding degree. Did coherence theories at least one of these two properties do not, it is called moderate coherence theories.
Properties of coherent systems of belief
There are several conditions that are demanded of coherent belief systems. Will be discussed, inter alia:
- Condition the degree of crosslinking: A belief system is so coherent, the more inferential relations (logical and explanatory relations ) link the beliefs.
- Condition of the Declaration Strength: A belief system is so consistent, the better are the explanations which link the beliefs.
- Inkonsistenzbedingung: A belief system is so coherent, the less contradictions (logical or probabilistic inconsistencies ) may occur.
- Subsystem Condition: A belief system is so coherent, the less it contains subsystems that are mutually relatively little cross-linked.
- Anomalies Condition: A belief system is so coherent, the less explanation anomalies
- Race condition: A belief system is so coherent, the less competing explanations occur.
- Stability condition: A belief system is so coherent, the more stable was the belief system in the past.
Coherence and consistency
Frequently, especially by critics of the coherence theory, coherence and consistency are identified ( consistency ), ie only the consistency condition is required by the conditions mentioned.
Already Joachim and Ewing but have already pointed out that coherence and consistency should not be confused.
Many coherence theorists who have seen the difference, consider consistency as a necessary condition for coherence, ie each coherent belief system is consistent according to this view, but not every consistent belief system also automatically coherent. In addition to Joachim and Ewing eg Stout and Rescher held this position.
BonJour has made consistency is a necessary precondition for coherence, so as not to become too complicated coherence theory.
Arc has shown that this assumption for the studies of Newton 's law of gravitation is to implausible.
The background for such reviews is that rich and complex theories that contain some inconsistencies are better than other theories that are less rich, but consistent.
Representatives of the coherence theory that does not consider the consistency as necessary usually go on the assumption that a coherent belief system should be as consistent as possible.
One particular issue form probabilistic inconsistencies, ie beliefs that are not true to each other logically contradictory, but their common validity is highly unlikely.
Komprehensivität
Bradley calls the smaller preferable comprehensive belief systems:
"The highter and resist my structure, and the more did any Particular fact or set of facts is implied in structure did, the more Certain are the structure and the facts. "
This property is referred to as Komprehensivität. Ewing describes the lack of Komprehensivität as
" [ ... ] The factthat seeking a coherent system of propositions always covers only a very limited part or aspect of reality [ ... ] "
Rescher distinguishes between two forms of Komprehensitivität, the external and the internal Komprehensivität Komprehensivität. While it comes at the external Komprehensivität by Rescher that the data are as plentiful included, it comes with the internal Komprehensivität to a maximization of the system.
In current coherence theories, especially in coherence theories that follow the constraint approach of Thagard and Verbeurgt, but for example also in the terms of the coherence by BonJour and Bartel Borth, the Komprehensivität is a derived property that follows from other properties and is not explicitly required.
Context
The different coherence theorists are very different thus avoided, because what it is, a belief system is divided into several independent parts.
Blanshard called for, bearing in mind that when it includes causal links to the Entailments:
"Fully coherent knowledge would be knowledge in Which every judgment entailed, and what entailed by, the rest of the System. "
Ewing has a weaker condition formulated as Blanshard and required that each proposition can be derived in a completely coherent system from the rest of the system.
Similarly coheres by Bosanquet a system A, B, C, if C follows from A and B, B of A and C and A from B and C. Rescher refers to this property as an asset of ( inferential ) redundancy.
The characterization of Ewing and Bosanquet has the property that a part of a coherent system not in turn must be coherent.
As a further condition for the coherence called Ewing that a coherent system is a set whose elements are each other's relevant.
As a concrete expression of this condition allows the determination of the congruence by Lewis conceive, who writes that a lot of statements is called congruent if and only if the probability of each of their statements increases when the others as true premises are accepted.
Very similar Chisholm formulated in its estimates of competition that a set A of propositions is competitor for S if and only if A is a set of three or more propositions of which each proposition is probably due to the conjunction of the other for S.
Hansson / Olsson have referred to this principle as a principle of the residual support.
Price describes a system as a coherent if the truth of each of their premises makes the truth of the rest of the system more likely.
Coherence theory of understanding people
Read and Miller have made in 1989 advised of the possibility of a coherence theory of understanding people. Later, Kunda, Thagard, Bartel Borth and Scholz have dealt with this problem. Based on a coherence theory of person understanding is Davidson's forbearance principle, that is, the idea that we can let other people only understand if we accept the coherence of their beliefs, that is, if we assume that their beliefs largely consistent ( consistent) and coherently are.
Coherence theory of decision
Thagard and Millgram have considered decisions as coherence problems about goals and possible actions. Barnes / Thagard have extended the coherence theory of decision on emotional decisions. Also, Hurley has made a contribution to the coherence theory of decision. Teacher has an analogy between acceptance and preference pulled and implicitly represent a coherence theory of decision.
Coherence theories of ethical and moral justification
Since it is often about moral choices in ethics, ethical theories can be constructed on the basis of coherence theories of decision.
An example of an ethical theory, which is based on coherence, is the theory of justice of John Rawls, whose justification is based on a " reflective equilibrium " between the participants in the (hypothetical) choice of principles of justice.
Coherence theory of concepts
Founder of the coherence theory of concepts is Firth. It assumes that all terms are linked together in some way and that we can understand a concept only complete if we also understood the other. A system of meanings of terms is then coherently according to Firth, when introducing a new concept has an impact on the entire system of concepts.
Later, the coherence theory of concepts primarily by Thagard was expanded.
Gregory K. Murphy and L. Douglas Medin emphasize that the question of the coherence of concepts closely linked to the question of why certain objects form a concept and not others. You have the similarity back as a measure of the coherence of terms, since all terms are similar to each other at an appropriate similarity measure. The key for them is the consistency of the theory in which the terms are used. Thus, for Murphy and Medin Douglas, the term apple - or - Prinzahl not very coherent, as a theory that would contain this term would not be very coherent.