Phenomenology (philosophy)

Phenomenology ( from Ancient Greek φαινόμενον phainomenon, Visible ',' appearance ', and λόγος lógos, speech ', 'doctrine' ) is a philosophical movement that was coined in the early decades of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl (older uses of the term since the 18. century). Their representatives see the origin of knowledge acquisition in immediately given phenomena, precisely the phenomena. Give the formal descriptions of the phenomena in principle the right of all phenomenological approaches again, whether philosophical or scientific, literary or psychological. They differ only in the way they deal with the immediately given.

3.1 The path from Husserl to Heidegger
3.2 Hans Lipps ' hermeneutic of reality
3.3 Max Scheler values ethics
3.4 The late beliefs Eugen Fink
3.5 The phenomenology in thinking of Michel Foucault
3.6 Emmanuel Levinas and the phenomenology
3.7 Phenomenology and the critique of ideology with Jürgen Habermas

4.1 Phenomenology of strangers
4.2 Life phenomenology
4.3 Structure phenomenology
4.4 Deep phenomenology
4.5 Phenomenology
4.6 phenomenology and analytic philosophy

5.1 Legal phenomenology
5.2 Phenomenological approach in the natural sciences
5.3 Phenomenological attitude in therapeutic theories

6.1 Husserl's works
6.2 Introductions and overviews
6.3 Book Series
6.4 effective history Husserl
6.5 International distribution
6.6 phenomenology and analytic philosophy
6.7 Legal phenomenology
6.8 Magazines
6.9 Further reading

Conceptual history

The word "phenomenon" describes a phenomenon already in ancient Greek (see the etymology of phenomenon ), thus a perceptible by the senses single event is meant. The importance of such phenomena has been prepared by the school of skeptics, which sees itself as a check on the metaphysical dogmatism of the previous philosophical schools such as the Parmenides of Elea. The term " phenomenology " or " phenomenological " dates back to the 18th century and can be found in Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (philosophy of the ancients ), and Johann Heinrich Lambert (On the way to prove the metaphysics, theology and morality proper, 1762 ). This term as a Phaenomenologia or optica transcendentalis. In Lambert's signature New Organon or thoughts on the Exploration and Identification of True and its distinction from error and illusion, Part 4: Phenomenology or doctrine of the bill ( 1764) a doctrine of appearance is distinguished from a doctrine of truth.

Kant uses the term also serves to name the doctrine of the limits of sensuality. This resulted in, among other things his Critique of Pure Reason. Furthermore, the term in the work of Hegel, especially in the Phenomenology of Spirit, for all the phenomena of the mind awareness, history and thought. The Phenomenology of Spirit is understood as a science of the experience of consciousness, which initially is still absolute immediacy, returns to absolute knowledge later. Franz Brentano used the term alternative phenomenological or descriptive psychology. Independent philosophical method is phenomenology but only by Edmund Husserl in the early 20th century.

Husserl's phenomenology

Husserl's goal is to rehabilitate philosophy as a " first science " ( prima philosophia ). According to Husserl, only a phenomenological philosophy can satisfy the preconditions of a truly rigorous science, because naturalistic or experimental philosophy is based on prejudice and assumptions existence, so do not " own stuff " is based on the. This orientation characterizes the entire flow of phenomenology. It aims to ensure that the sciences can only be guided by evidence that stem from the immediate consciousness experience.

Husserl makes this connection in an article in the Encyclopædia Britannica in 1927 as follows:

" Phenomenology designates a come at the turn of the century in philosophy breakthrough novel descriptive method and a priori from it emerged Science, which is intended to provide the basic Organon for a strictly scientific philosophy and to allow in a consistent impact a methodical reform of all sciences. "

In this article, three key aspects of the phenomenology of Husserl are:

Deskription as a method
Priori nature of phenomenology (scientific claim )
Foundation for all other sciences

These three aspects are binding for all subsequent phenomenologists structural features of phenomenology - even if they have undergone in the development of phenomenology and the conversion of phenomenological research community clearly criticism.

Root of phenomenology

Husserl's phenomenology is strongly influenced by Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology, which also describes psychic phenomena independent of the physical stimuli producing them. In contrast to an empirical psychology, Brentano had formed the concept of intentional consciousness. This reflects the belief that consciousness never is unrelated to anything: consciousness is always consciousness of something.

"Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what have the intentional (also called probably mental ) inexistence of an object, the scholastics of the Middle Ages, and what we, although with not quite unambiguous expressions, the reference to a content, direction toward an object ( among which / not to be understood here is a reality ), or immanent objectivity would call the. Each includes something as object within itself, although not all. Equally The idea is presented something in which judgments something is approved or rejected, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire to desire, etc. This intentional inexistence is exclusively peculiar to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like it. "

This seemingly trivial discovery paves the way for one of the fundamental problems of philosophy - the division of the world into subject and object. On the basis of the intentional character of consciousness, this problem could be handled from a new perspective.

Also Brentano was thought that can not be the foundations of logic justified in a naturalistic psychology. Husserl takes up this aspect and expands this idea of Brentano's descriptive psychology on a transcendental phenomenology, which seeks to explain the possibilities of consciousness files at all.

The Psychologismuskritik

The philosophical starting point Husserl was the ruling in his time assumption that truths must be regarded as relative and only in their respective historical form show ( historicism ) or product of a naturalistic imaginary psyche ( psychologism ). Philosophy would not be a form of knowledge gaining more and this task would be output to the psychology. This view continued his critique of psychologism against Husserl. According to Husserl, is the thesis of psychologism, logic is a part of psychology, as these deal itself as a science of the psyche with the laws of thought, wrong. Thus, logic would be the doctrine of thinking, reasoning and judgment, and a special case of psychic abilities. Husserl contradicts this view in two ways. First, he shows that the consequence of psychologism had a mere relativity logical laws result. Thus, the principle of contradiction would be a mere probability that empirical rules can not claim universal validity.

Another problem relates to the acts of thought and its accuracy. If the laws of logic purely empirical in nature would be derived from the laws of thought, so that was not clear that this would also be correct. So there is perfectly logical false judgments, which also arise from the thought. Thus, the criterion of accuracy can not be in thought itself, unless false judgments would be subject to a different sequence of thought, which then in turn the question remains what is for now the criterion for right or wrong. Husserl believes that the psychologism ultimately the thought content, eg judgment, not of the intellect course, distinguishes the judgments themselves. Thus, the judgments is itself real, while the content of judgment is ideal. This distinction between the content and the act of thinking, between "Genesis" and " validity ", will remain constitutively in the wake of phenomenology.

Free variation

Methodologically, the most widely used is the free variation, which is the descriptive approach of phenomenology next. By free variation in imagination different but resembling things can be presented. Each of these things is limited only by the logical possibility, not of their possibility of existence (example: Goethe's concept of the archetypal plant ). In this free variation then constants can be discovered, in which the different variants " cover ", such as scarlet fever and Bordeaux are indeed different shades, but both red. It is this coverage, this identity in the eidetic variation, which results in that universality which Husserl refers to the term " idea". The Husserlian eidos is without his metaphysics a Platonic idea. It is the essence, a public which is given graphically intuitive. What is important is the difference between empirical and generalization of these Ideation: Empirical intuition is always limited, while pure eidetic variation is infinite, because it not only looks at the currently existing, but all logical possibilities takes to complete. If philosophy is to be a rigorous science, according to Husserl, it needs this universality and given by them possibility of a last justification, which is the phenomenology.

Intentionality of consciousness

Intentionality is the central concept of Husserl's phenomenology at all. It engages in the Psychologismuskritik already indicated problems of subject and object again. With intentionality is meant the fact that our consciousness is always directed towards something, so an awareness " of something". This name can be in the consideration of a phenomenon illustrate: Everyday perceptions, such as the perception of people or objects, taking place in a non-reflected setting that does not question the meaningfulness of the person or thing in question. Husserl is now expected that this meaningfulness is something that we attribute to things. One example is the so-called deception. Let's look at a mannequin in a shop window where we are facing, it may happen that we notice surprised that it has not been for a doll, but a human. At that moment - and this is the time at which turns the deception - changed the meaning of this figure. So I behave, for example, no longer so when I was unobserved.

Edmund Husserl speaks in his ideas to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (also ideas I) noesis and noema of the basic moments of subject constitution and thus as the limit of what can be said (see also Ludwig Wittgenstein). " Noesis " means, as the act of consciousness relates to its object ( think, want, hate, love ) and " noema " as the subject through this noetic acts appears (the one believed, Wanted, Hated, lover).

For example, the noema of perception of a tree is the " tree Perceived ". However, this differs fundamentally from the tree now that can burn, for example, while the tree perception that can not, because it has no real properties. However, the perception of tree has its own representational meaningfulness: for example, can grow trees, are to handle. The tree is thus understood as something that is so and so structured. The fact that we somewhat as something vermeinen, is the central idea of Husserl called intentionality. ( The subject can be analogous perhaps to illustrate the example of picture puzzles: can see the adjacent picture puzzle as an example of how the supposed intentional Fold between two meanings. )

Similar to the picture puzzle of substance (Greek hyle ) is our perception only by the intentional act as eg real, fantasized, dreamed, etc. meant. This means we put the Hyle has meaning with. Now get the objects of biology also enclosed a sense, for example, according to Husserl, such as " moves by itself and reproduces itself ." The underlying meaningfulness is the so-called material ontology that Husserl referred to as regional ontology. According to Husserl, these regional ontologies are the basis for the sciences, but they constitute only the object sense of the themes of the individual sciences.

How can it be but that we ( as ) once saw a doll in the window, the other time a person? Husserl would say that we had a perception both times. The deception is first a perception that later turns out to be an illusion. What has changed is only the meaningfulness with which we had occupied the aspects of our perception: inanimate thing - person. So for there to be illusions, we must obviously the objects can attach a meaning which, however, also may change again. A central concept in Husserl's terminology is the shading. Objects are never presented to us as a complete unit, but show us only in side view. We never have complete perspective on it, which would correspond to ultimately complete the imperceptibility of the object. Therefore a prerequisite of perception is the perspective, but also simultaneously accounts so that the concealment of the matter, therefore, the phenomenon of deception allows only.

The epistemological point of this approach is the resolution of the aporia that has left after Husserl empiricism and rationalism. Since its supporters to approach the phenomenon in Abständigkeit world by adopting a an outer world, the others by making them perceive as a product of reason, they are not strictly in accordance with the phenomenon before. If they do so, Husserl, they would find that we perceive neither us first and then then us but always experience the world first, the world and ourselves already in the world equally original. This complementarity of world consciousness and describes the structure of intentionality. By seeing the world and things as objectively intendiere ( vermeine ), they get their independence from our consciousness. By Husserl traces this structure of consciousness, he succeeds on the classic problems of epistemology to go. Method applied, Husserl still in a strict, based on a phenomenon description. Important aspects are the Epoché and the eidetic reduction:

Epoché and eidetic reduction

The method of Epoché ( abstention, pause ) is the elimination of the general thesis of the natural attitude for Husserl. The bracketing the associated preconceptions Husserl called " eidetic reduction ". Initially, all theoretical assumptions ( hypotheses, reasoning, knowledge handed down ...) can be turned off through the observed object (see reductionism ). In a second step ( the transcendental eidetic reduction) the existence of the object is disregarded so far that only the " quiddity " show, that is, what is the object, its essence.

From the perspective of transcendental consciousness being is viewed only as a correlate of consciousness - being, ie, without assumptions or judgments about the actual being or non-being of the contents of consciousness. This method approaches the thought experiments of Descartes and Hobbes on the so -called " doomsday " ( the question: What is preserved when it would no longer be the physical world? ). But this also follows immediately one of the biggest problems of phenomenology. Husserl had namely the above-mentioned difference between act of consciousness ( noesis ) and awareness - content ( noema ) attached. This corresponds to a classification that distinguishes what is consciousness and what it means ( because according to Brentano, consciousness is always intentional ). But how can one say that the contents of consciousness still have meaning when all existence has been excluded? Husserl wanted to exclude the existence, since the objects according to him transcend consciousness: if they exist, so there it is outside the consciousness itself in order to gain access to the pure ideas, so their existence must be excluded. The phenomenology must be able to answer when and how it was possible that consciousness is "consciousness - transcendent " refers to something. Husserl's explanation will be that the content is well - transcendent awareness, but that the intending should be awareness - immanent self. So something is always intended immanent as it is intended as awareness - transcendent, because if it were to exist, would be outside of consciousness.

Effective history of Husserl

At the beginning of the reception history of phenomenology is the " Philosophical Society Göttingen", a discussion forum, where from 1910 to 1920, among others, Alexandre Koyré, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Theodor Conrad, Hedwig Martius ( after her marriage in 1912 she was named Hedwig Conrad- Martius ) Hans Lipps, Edith Stein, Roman Ingarden and Adolf Grimme to Husserl and Adolf Reinach gathered. The phenomenology became one of the most important trends in contemporary continental philosophy. The sociology benefited from it mainly by the work of Alfred Schutz and later in ethnomethodological research approaches. The phenomenology influenced the values of ethics as the essence of the ethical analysis ( Moritz Geiger, Hans Reiner, Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand ), found its way into psychology (Alexander pledges ) and the Law ( Adolf Reinach ). The phenomenological thinking has decisively influenced the development of existentialism in Germany and France and ahead. It takes place in accordance with the most important works of Jean -Paul Sartre. In Maurice Merleau -Ponty perception and body are the focus of the phenomenological creation, with Paul Ricoeur language and memory. Especially true pursued Eugen Fink, a former assistant to Husserl, whose line. Martin Heidegger, however, also Husserl's assistant and one of the most prominent representatives of phenomenological philosophy, developed his own phenomenological approach, with him the concept of being plays the central role. The Czech philosopher January Patocka is mentioned. Husserl's ideas also exerted a strong influence on Laura Perls, one of the founders of Gestalt therapy.

The road from Husserl to Heidegger

The road from Husserl to Heidegger can be viewed from different points of view. But central aspect is certainly the thought of Heidegger and criticism of Husserl that man himself can not be written in the phenomenological epoche, since, according to Heidegger, 'll just be apart of what making up this: its existence. On the basis of Being and Time, which is dedicated to Husserl, however, identify how much is the method of phenomenology of Heidegger's question of Being. Heidegger refers to the phenomenon as "the self- at - him - even - pointing ", than what shows up on being itself as what it is: the being of beings. He concludes: " Ontology is possible only as phenomenology " Ernst Tugendhat sees the crucial development step of Heidegger's phenomenology is that they, in contrast to Husserl, who have only the " givenness of objects " in view, expand the view and " under the title disclosedness and clearing of the possibility of the dimension of givenness and truth as such " ask.

Hans Lipps ' hermeneutic of reality

While Husserl the decline to a " transcendental ego " called for, which is to first of all constitute the actual people and Heidegger worked out in Being and Time, his existential analytic of Dasein as fundamental ontology, asks Hans Lipps: " How will the manifold meaning of being just the Constitution experience of my existence? " For him, human existence in the interpretation of reality is founded philosophy is" responsible assumption of myself. "

Max Scheler's ethics values

Max Scheler had a methodical approach to phenomenology. In the center of his thinking is the substantive values of ethics, which he describes as a special domain of phenomena in terms of the phenomenological method.

The late beliefs Eugen Fink

Eugen Fink was a long -time assistant and student of Edmund Husserl, and ultimately self -authorized interpreter of Husserl 's phenomenology. Even more significant was his speech at the phenomenological colloquium in Brussels in 1951. Fink announced here that Husserl's approach is not as presuppositions, as Husserl, and had always stressed as a result he himself. The reflections on appearance, being, objects, object and beings are the phenomenological method previously and not their result.

The phenomenology in the thought of Michel Foucault

Michel Foucault was in his early writings strongly influenced by phenomenology, in particular by Heidegger. Only in his genealogical writings, he subjects the phenomenology of intense criticism.

Emmanuel Levinas and the phenomenology

The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas is one of the phenomenologists, who perhaps farthest from the approach of Husserl and there still remained faithful to him. Influenced both by his Jewish tradition as well as Martin Heidegger, Levinas developed an ethic that draws inspiration from the face of the other. Since the Other for Levinas never catch up, that is to be understood in its totality, is by him from a claim which ultimately exceeds everything. It is interesting in this context, the often -made comparison between Martin Buber and Levinas. Although both in the Jewish tradition have some of their roots, Buber sees the opposite one in principle the same, while this would happen for Levinas just mean the end of any ethics.

Phenomenology and ideology critique with Jürgen Habermas

However, by Jürgen Habermas shares the criticism of Husserl on objectivist self- understanding of the sciences, he would warn against falling into another objectivism, which detracts from the legitimate knowledge-constitutive subjective interests.

Contemporary phenomenological theories

The phenomenology has influenced many contemporary philosophical currents. It should be noted that in many cases just philosophers who face critical of phenomenology, were, for example, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida strongly influenced by them.

Phenomenology of strangers

Bernhardswald rock has developed with its responsive phenomenology, which is strongly oriented to Merleau -Ponty, Phenomenology of a stranger, in which the stranger is described as not exceeding the border region. In particular, in socially important problem areas such as violence, stranger, disease and death has its phenomenology out of bounds access.

Life phenomenology

The Michel Henry (1922-2002) founded a radical phenomenology of life is made up of classical phenomenology and even from the early Merleau -Ponty as far as it does not seek to fathom from this even in the world what appears, but on an original ( self- - ) show tranzendentaler subjectivity in life leads back. Here, Henry can V.A. inspired by the teachings of an inner bodily apperception at Maine de Biran.

Structure phenomenology

In the critical connection to Husserl and Heidegger and the phenomenological in Exceeded basic approaches of, Transcendental or horizon - Phenomenology in Husserl and, Ontological or existence phenomenology ' in Heidegger, Heinrich Rombach unfolds with genetic or structural phenomenology, a phenomenology of The Worlds '.

Deep phenomenology

The depth phenomenology is a founded by José Sánchez de Murillo and significantly developed variant of phenomenology. She goes on in 1977 began research in the field of German Romanticism - especially Jacob Boehme, Franz von Baader and Schelling - back. Important for the depth phenomenology were as the opened by Martin Heidegger and Jean -Paul Sartre avenues of research. Therefore, the depth phenomenology attempts to uncover hidden basic conditions of natural and anthropological phenomena to brighten their deep meaning for life and to convey it to people.

New phenomenology

The new phenomenology is introduced from the 1993 Kieler emeritus philosophy professor Hermann Schmitz and significantly developed variant of phenomenology. In particular, the collaboration with the scientific fields of medicine and psychology for the new phenomenology of meaning. Basis of the new phenomenology is a rediscovery of the involuntary life experience from what everyone vortheoretisch feel against his own body.

The philosopher and pupil of Guido Schmitz Rappe has taken the approach of a new phenomenology in parts and further developed. As a significant extension, the systematic treatment of the biographical dimension of the body can be seen, which is found at Schmitz only in its infancy.

Phenomenology and analytic philosophy

In the first generation of so-called representatives of the phenomenology and analytic philosophy partly consisted reciprocal relationships, such as between Husserl and Gottlob Frege. Otherwise it will be among representatives of analytical philosophy, which provide language-analytical methods for the reconstruction of statements to the center, it is the orientation of formal languages or the orientation of the vernacular. A time and content of common origin of phenomenology and analytical philosophy, one follows the presentation Michael Dummett, the criticism of Frege, Brentano and Husserl on psychologism. Thoughts are not to be analyzed according to Frege by the mechanics of individual mental operations, but are time- independent objects, which do not occur in causation relations. Bernard Bolzano Also, inter alia the was received in this point of Husserl and Alexius Meinong, a sharp distinction between ideas or thoughts to yourself ( objectively ) and the subjective awareness of them. The logic has to do with the former, while the psychologism urged to adhere to the latter. As a result, but both approaches diverge such that the most representative of the phenomenology did not share the accomplished of some important representatives of analytical philosophy of linguistic analysis orientation. Husserl's descriptive nature of science then take about a systematic " analysis" and " Deskription " in the " directions of looking circumstances that present themselves ." In contrast, representatives of normal linguistic philosophy as the late Wittgenstein -oriented ( "grammar" ) to determine the program, the nature of the objects by analyzing the use of related linguistic expressions. As Husserl explicitly contrast, turned to spoon-feed can be in strict science down to the " things themselves " " grammatical analysis " of these lines of research for a long time were considered incompatible. However, other authors also emphasize stitching both directions. So there were about Husserl and Heidegger also a turn to language and its use. JL Austin says 1956/57, of " linguistic phenomenology ". But is meant primarily as the late Wittgenstein, "guidance on the use of language, but with a reality beyond this claim for cases in which the ordinary language has no words and then forming new words." The language- analytical orientation have shared but no phase all analytic philosophers. In particular, key issues, terms and approaches of classical phenomenology are also developed in parts of the analytical philosophy of mind since the 1970s, including about the approach to the first-person perspective for the study of intentionality and phenomenal quality of states of consciousness and structures of consciousness at all. Such research programs are sometimes called " analytic phenomenology " means (analytical phenomenology ) since the turn of the century. Among the most important representatives include Roderick Chisholm, Dagfinn Follesdal, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Hubert Dreyfus, Uriah Kriegel, David Woodruff Smith, Barry Smith.

Phenomenology in other sciences

In many sciences is spoken by a phenomenological attitude. However, sometimes this is different from the phenomenology of Husserl and the use of the term by the following philosophers, as phenomenology does not stop at the mere description of the facts in the sense mentioned above. Most scientific approaches that provided phenomenologically with the label, fall back on a more original meaning of the term phenomenology; they argue, for example, no eidetic reduction. However, this should not obscure the fact that in some branches of phenomenology, such as the classical legal phenomenology and the original phenomenological method is retained.

The neologism phenomenologically is often used popular science, it is usually meant as a subject of the merely phenomenal. But the Phenomenal is initially a mere appearance, not the reality behind it, or mere appearance, which refers to an to be recognized physical or mental being. Phenomenology is confused here with phenomenalism, a position of early positivism, a variety of subjective idealism, whose opponent is the realism. A close look at the intentionality and the Epoché and their results illustrate the difference between the two positions. (see above)

Right phenomenology

The legal phenomenology goes back to Edmund Husserl and was differentiated mainly by the legal philosopher Adolf Reinach. Wilhelm cubbyhole also a student of Husserl, initially led the work Reinach's continued critical, but later developed its own story phenomenology, which turned away from Reinach. How more Rechtsphänomenologen trying to find based on the phenomenology an answer to what is right. Or in the words of phenomenology: What is the nature of law. The legal phenomenology has represented isolated supporters in Germany and the Netherlands, most however it is in Italy and Spain.

Phenomenological approach in the natural sciences

The "first look " on the empirical data material for a research project, the first phase of a systematic scientific work ( fabric collection ) is often referred to as phenomenology. Phenomenologically here means mostly the facts to describe the thing itself. Thus, a test procedure is described as possible without the aid of theories (which only partially is of course possible because the theory itself already determined the experimental setup and procedure ), animal behavior, just described ( in the context of a theory of biology), not interpreted in terms of human understanding only seen what happens. The term phenomenon that is here to basically, is the naturalistic appearance, however, a deeper, but not necessarily a logical and rational manner truth can be based.

Phenomenological attitude in therapeutic theories

In theories of humanistic- psychotherapeutic directions as Gestalt therapy, talk therapy or logotherapy and existential analysis, phenomenology is often as an epistemological tool in the foreground. Besides Husserl also philosophers such as Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas also phenomenologists like can be mentioned. Karl Jaspers established a psychopathological phenomenology. Common to all theories is the caution with respect to faster interpretation, theories do not want to absolutise, but to always stay connected to the concrete experience of the everyday, as well as to respect the autonomy of the experience of others. Thus they consider the phenomenology but only as a methodological approach form. That Husserl indeed operational theory and reflexive and descriptions carried out, is not a priority in these therapeutic procedures. The reflexive focus and transcendental issues are not addressed in these procedures. Thus, the phenomenological parlance, the theoretical relations with phenomenology is limited in the sense of Husserl's phenomenology, only associative.

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